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A UNIFYING THEORY FOR THE LITIGATION




As the use of computers has increased dramatically, so has the ille-
gal copying and adaptation of computer software. Because programs
can be varied quickly and easily, however, copying of programs can be
disguised more readily than copying of literary and other artistic works.
Thus, factfinders, particularly those unfamiliar with computer software,
may not be able to detect copying by comparing competing programs for
"substantial similarity, " as traditionally is done in copyright cases. Pro-
fessor Conley and Mr. Bryan argue that courts should focus on whether
the alleged infringer's actual conduct constitutes infringement. This ap-
proach is not only practical, but more consistent with language in the
1976 Copyright Act prohibiting conduct other than verbatim copying.
Companies and individuals engaged in high technology businesses are real-
izing increasingly that computer programs and the intellectual work product
they embody are assets of great value. I In some instances, computer software
may be a business' only substintial asset. Thus, intellectual property protection
is one of the most significant legal problems that high technology companies face
regularly. This Article focuses on one important type of protection, copyright.
For reasons that will be developed more fully in sections I and II of the
Article, copyright protection is likely to be central to any broader program of
protection of the intellectual property embodied in computer programs. The
federal courts are familiar at least with the general contours of copyright law,
and the copyright statute provides aniple authority for meaningful relief. None-
theless, copyright law evolved in the preelectronic era, and the articulation of
modem technology and copyright principles derived from art, literature, and
music is less than precise. Accordingly, a computer copyright case presents
novel legal challenges on both the theoretical and practical levels.
The purpose of this Article is to identify, analyze, and offer solutions to
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New Issue, Bus. WK. Aug. 1, 1983, at 90, 91 (discussing economic value of software and financial
threat of illegal copying through rentals).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
several important problems endemic to computer copyright litigation. In sec-
tions IA and IB, the Article reviews the process of writing a computer program
to identify the various species of intellectual property that a typical program
may embody. In section IC, the legal protections available for these various
categories of intellectual property are discussed. In section II the Article re-
views the procedural aspe'cts of copyright litigation; section III presents an anal-
ysis of the traditional elements of copyright protection and the evidence
necessary to prove infringement, discusses a number of special problems of proof
common to computer cases, and suggests several strategies to overcome such
difficulties. The principal thesis that the Article sets forth in sections IV and V
is that the evidentiary standard relied on in the vast majority of literary copy-
right cases-the substantial similarity test-is likely to be of limited utility in a
software case. Instead, courts should examine other types of direct and circum-
stantial evidence of the defendant's conduct that often may be available in
software cases. The controlling determination should be whether the defendant
has derived a substantial and lasting economic advantage by borrowing from the
plaintiff's program information that fairly can be characterized as expression.
I. COMPUTER PROGRAMMING AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
A. The Process of Writing a Computer Program
Computer programs, often known as software, instruct in code the machin-
ery of a computer system, the hardware, to run and to perform various tasks.
2
Programs, to borrow a phrase from Arthur Koestler, are the "ghost in the
machine."'3 Computer programs can perform an almost infinite variety of func-
tions. Systems programs control the basic functioning of the hardware and
make it generally available for specific uses to which it may be put.4 In legal
terminology, such systems programs might be described as "procedural." Their
"substantive" counterparts are applications programs, 5 which cause a computer
to perform such specific tasks as printing a document, computing an average, or
doing a word search within a body of case law.6 The following discussion per-
tains to both of these major software categories.
A computer program typically is written in several steps.7 First, the
2. Synercom Tech., Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1005 (N.D. Tex.
1978); see I D. BENDER, COMPUTER LAW § 2.06 (1984); J. SOMA, COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY AND
THE LAW § 1.06 (1983); Note, Copyright Protection of Computer Program Object Code, 96 HARV. L.
REv. 1723, 1724 (1983).
3. A. KOESTLER, THE GHOsT IN THE MACHINE (1967).
4. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d Cir. 1983),
cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984); 1 D. BENDER, supra note 2, § 2.06[2]; J. SOMA, supra note 2,
§2.01, at 23.
5. For a discussion of the distinction between systems and applications programs, see Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104
S. Ct. 690 (1984); 1 D. BENDER, supra note 2, § 1.05[1]; J. SOMA, supra note 2, § 1.06.
6. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d Cir. 1983),
cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984); 1 D. BENDER, supra note 2, § 2.06[3]; J. SOMA, supra note 2,
§2.01, at 23-24.
7. See I D. BENDER, supra note 2, § 2.06[3]; Davidson, Protecting Computer Software: A
Comprehensive Analysis, 23 JURIMETRICS J. 337, 341-42 (1983).
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programmer studies the function to be performed and outlines the general struc-
ture of the program.8 In writing a program to perform statistical calculations,
for example, the programmer first might outline a number of procedures. One
procedure might calculate means, one might perform correlation analysis, and
another might execute regression analysis. Having thus determined the pro-
gram's general structure, the programmer then might break it down into sec-
tions, or modules, each of which would be designed to perform one or more
tasks.9 Within the regression procedure, a single module might accept and or-
ganize input data, several other modules might do portions of the necessary cal-
culations, and a final module might organize the output data. The organization
of the program at various levels is a largely discretionary process, and the deci-
sions made at the organizational stage may affect the program's efficiency and
utility.
Only after the programmer thus conceives and organizes the program is he
ready to begin writing the computer code.10 At this level, programming is done
in blocks, each of which implements a specific function. A block of code may
embody one or more algorithms, which are step-by-step logical procedures for
solving programming problems.1" The algorithm chosen to accomplish a partic-
ular functional objective may determine in part the contents of a segment of
code. Nonetheless, writing the code is often a highly creative process, and pro-
grammers could choose various coding techniques to achieve the same func-
tional objective. 12 Once again, the programmer's choices will influence the
program's accuracy, efficiency, and flexibility.
The code that the programmer writes is called the "source code." 13 Source
code usually is written in a "high-level" computer language, meaning one that is
similar to English. 14 Source code can be understood readily by other program-
8. See 1 D. BENDER, supra note 2, §2.06[3][a].
9. See id.
10. For a general discussion of writing code, see id. § 2.06[3][d] and authorities cited therein;
Davidson, supra note 7, at 341.
11. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 564
F. Supp. 1358, 1367 (D. Del. 1983). C. SIPPLE: & R. SIPPLE, COMPUTER DICTIONARY AND HAND-
BOOK (2d ed. 1972), defines the term "algorithm" more comprehensively as:
(1) A fixed step-by-step procedure for accomplishing a given result; usually a simplified
procedure for solving a complex problem, also a full statement of a finite number of steps.
(2) A defined process or set of rules that leads [sic] and assures development of a desired
output from a given input. A sequence of formulas and/or algebraic/logical steps to calcu-
late or determine a given task; processing rules.
Id. at 23, quoted in Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358, 1367 (D. Del. 1983). For varying interpretations of the term, see Diamond
v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175,186 n.9 (1981); In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 915-16 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Phillips,
608 F.2d 879, 882-83 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
12. See generally NAT'L COMM'N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS,
FINAL REPORT 18-23 (1978) (distinguishing function from expression in programs) [hereinafter cited
as CONTU REPORT]. Cf Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253
(3d Cir. 1983) (discussing extent of originality in operating systems), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690
(1984).
13. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d Cir. 1983),
cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984).
14. Id.; see 1 D. BENDER, supra note 2, § 2.06[3][c]; J. SOMA, supra note 2, glossary at 419;
Davidson, supra note 7, at 341.
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mers and thus would be helpful in copying the program or appropriating the
programming concepts and methods that the program embodies.
The computer does not use the source code directly to execute the program
or otherwise perform work. First, another program, called a compiler, through
a complex process reads and translates source code into a language that the
computer can read and execute.15 This version of the program is called "object
code." Object code is loaded onto the computer on a storage medium such as a
tape, disk, or semiconductor chip. 16 Few computer programmers are willing
and able to read object code; its distribution therefore poses less of a security risk
than the distribution of source code.17 Since object code is sufficient and gener-
ally necessary to execute the program, it almost always is distributed to users. 18
If the user wants to distribute the source code, he can negotiate the matter with
the proprietor. 19
A distinguishing characteristic of the programming process is its iterative
nature. As soon as the programmer has written enough code to produce a rough
working version of the program, he typically loads the code onto a computer for
repeated execution and analysis. This process is grossly analogous to an author
editing a literary work, although the programmer is more concerned with the
program's functional efficiency than the code's intellectual and aesthetic appeal,
and he is aided by the computer in identifying and correcting errors. The pro-
cess of testing, analysis, and refinement usually continues until and after com-
merical distribution; purchasers or licensees of commercial software often
receive updates, enhancements, and sequentially numbered versions of the pro-
gram. Although the editing process sometimes is called "debugging," to distin-
15. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d Cir. 1983),
cert dismissed, 104 S. Ct 690 (1984); 1 D. BENDER, supra note 2, § 2.0613][c]; Davidson, supra note
7, at 341, 382-83. The central processing unit of a computer is capable of performing only a very
small number of highly specific tasks. A typical mainframe computer may have slightly over 100
"operations" or "machine instructions" in its repertoire, each of which is identified by a numerical
"operation code." An operation code can be combined with additional information, such as a refer-
ence to a specific location in memory, to constitute a machine instruction word. A sequence of such
machine instruction words, stored in the computer's memory and executed sequentially by the cen-
tral processing unit, makes up a "machine language" program. Machine language is the only type of
programming language that the computer understands. 1 D. BENDER, supra note 2, § 2.0613](c].
Thus, if a program is coded in any other language it must be converted into machine language before
the computer can use it. Id.
16. Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 628 F.2d. 1038, 1040 (7th Cir. 1980); Note, supra
note 2, at 1725.
17. The development of technology for "decompiling" object code, or translating it back to
source code, is making object code distribution an increasing security threat. See Davidson, supra
note 7, at 411; Grogan, Decompilation and Disassembly: Undoing Software Protection, COMPUTER
LAW., Feb. 1984, at 1, 2; Laurie & Everett, Protection of Trade Secrets in Object Form Software: The
Case for Reverse Engineering, COMPUTER LAW., July 1984, at 1.
18. See Grogan, supra note 17, at 1-2.
19. Proprietors, of course, desire maximum copyright and trade secret protection for their intel-
lectual property. Users, however, may be concerned about access to the source code for mainte-
nance purposes if the proprietor goes out of business or otherwise fails to meet its maintenance
obligations. A method used increasingly to accommodate these competing concerns is to place
source code in escrow pending specified events of default; if the proprietor goes bankrupt, however,
the enforceability of such an escrow is uncertain. See Conley & Bryan, Software Escrow and "Cram-
Down" License Assignments under the New Bankruptcy Code, in PRAcTIcING LAW INSTITUTE,
COMPUTER LAW INSTITUTE 565 (D. Brooks ed. 1983).
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guish it from the initial writing of code, many programmers view the two
activities merely as related facets of a single creative process. 20 Early versions of
the program created during the debugging process often are preserved or
"archived" on paper or a computer memory device, providing an historical rec-
ord of a program's development.
The package that the user ultimately receives also may contain several
items not strictly part of the program but nonetheless essential to its use. The
documentation that accompanies most commercially distributed programs may
vary, depending on the program and the intended users, from simple instruc-
tions to a detailed guide for modifying the program for special needs. Although
the documentation rarely reproduces source code, detailed documentation may
reveal much about program structure and programming methods.2 1
Finally, many programs offer what is loosely termed a "language" to enable
the user to interact with the software. This Article previously has used "lan-
guage" to mean the computer language in which source code is written. In the
present context, "language" means a system of specified commands, statements,
and symbols with which a software user organizes and enters his own data and
directs the operation of the program. 22 Although the user language is not part
of the program in the sense of being a segment of the source or object code, user
language instructions cause the program to function and thus are essential to the
use of the program. Moreover, since the user sees and deals with the user lan-
guage, it may be the component of the program that the consumer most identi-
fies with the product.
B. The Species of Intellectual Property Embodied in Computer Programs
In its broadest sense, the term "intellectual property" includes, on one level,
ideas, concepts, know-how, and other creative abstractions, and on a second
level, the literary, artistic, or mechanical expressions that embody such abstrac-
tions.2 3 Intellectual property is distinct from tangible or physical property, even
though a single object may embody both. A book is tangible property that con-
tains expression that is intellectual property; the selling of the physical property
does not affect the author's right to control reproduction of his expression.24
Some computer scientists believe that every level of the programming pro-
cess yields valuable intellectual property on which the programmer has a propri-
etary claim.2 5 In the initial, organizational phase of software production, the
20. See 1 D. BENDER, supra note 2, § 2.06[3][e].
21. See Synercom Tech., Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 n.5 (N.D.
Tex. 1978); Davidson, supra note 7, at 379-80. Formerly, documentation often included actual
source code.
22. For descriptions of user languages used with two well-known statistical programs, see
BMDP STATISTICAL SOFTWARE 25 (W.J. Dixon ed. 1983); M. NoRusIs, SPSS INTRODUCTORY
STATISICS GUIDE 175 (1983).
23. See generally A. MILLER & M. DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, TRADE-
MARKS, AND COPYRIGHT 1-2 (1983) (reviewing types of intellectual property).
24. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1982).
25. A leading, recently-published text therefore recommends that software be subject to a "ma-
trix" of copyright, patent, and trade secret protection. J. SOMA, supra note 2, § 2.18, at 67-70.
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programmer's creative contribution is in the form of concepts and ideas.
Although most choices that the programmer makes in this phase are discretion-
ary to some extent, he often must choose among options on which he can assert
no claim, such as established programming languages or well-documented meth-
ods for breaking a task down into modules. At other times, however, the
programmer makes an identifiable creative contribution at this level, such as
organizing a novel programming task or devising a new modular structure that
improves on established means for achieving a particular functional end.
The intellectual property generated by the actual writing of source code
comprises both ideas and expression. At the level of ideas, the programmer
must choose how to organize individual lines and groups of lines, and what pro-
gramming strategies to employ in particular situations. 26 He may have to de-
velop algorithms or choose among available algorithms.2 7 Some of the concepts
and ideas employed at the code-writing level may be original, whereas others
simply will reflect borrowing or adaptation of the creative efforts of others.
A programmer writing code also must synthesize the words and symbols
that constitute actual programming statements. A line of code, like a line of
literary prose, is the programmer's expression of all the ideas and concepts that
the line embodies.2 8 At this final stage of programming, unless the programmer
is copying or closely following a preexisting work, his contributions probably
will be sufficiently original to give rise to a proprietary claim.
29
Software documentation is analytically indistinguishable from any other
nonfiction literary work. The documentation includes many concepts and ideas,
some borrowed and some original, which the author then expresses in a manner
he creates or borrows from another source.
30
It is particularly difficult to identify the intellectual property embodied in a
user language. The language typically will comprise words and symbols, some
original, others with counterparts in English, a programming language, or the
symbolism of mathematics and logic. 31 The language's syntax, or rules for ar-
ranging these elements, likewise may combine the author's original contribu-
tions with rules derived from English, a programming language, or
mathematics. When the language is used to cause the computer system to per-
form a task, the ultimate form of expression rests with the user, since he will
26. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text. In statistical programming, calculations often
may be done in a number of sequences: Although the choice of sequence may not affect the accuracy
of the calculations, it sometimes may affect computing efficiency. The cumulative effect of many
such choices therefore may influence the marketability of a software product.
27. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text. The choice of algorithm may have an effect
similar to that discussed supra note 26.
28. See CONTU RPORT, supra note 12, at 9-10, 20-21.
29. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249-54 (3d Cir.
1983) (discussing originality of expression in computer programs), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690
(1984); infra notes 194-246 and accompanying text.
30. See Synercom Tech., Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 n.5 (N.D.
Tex. 1978); 1 D. BENDER, supra note 2, § 2.06[3][f].
31. The language in the SAS statistical package is a good illustration of such a combination of
elements. See, eg., SAS Reference Guide 79.5 (SAS Institute, Inc. 1981); cf. 1 D. BENDER, supra
note 2, § 2.06[3][c] (discussing composition of high-level programming languages).
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select and combine elements to fit his data and programming needs.32 Thus,
although the author initially may contribute ideas and concepts, they may be
difficult to identify and segregate; at the level of expression, he may have little or
no claim of originality or even contribution. Nonetheless, regardless of the
source of the elements, the author legitimately may claim that synthesizing the
entire system required substantial creativity and ingenuity. Moreover, the user
language often is the user's primary or even sole contact with the author's
work.
33
C. Legal Theories Available to Protect Different
Categories of Intellectual Property
One or more legal theories are available to protect each category of intellec-
tual property discussed above. The choice of the theory or theories appropriate
to each category depends on both the nature of the intellectual property to be
protected and the method of distributing the software product.
1. Patent Protection
Patents protect "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof."'34 The pat-
entee holds the exclusive right to use, manufacture, and sell the patented inven-
tion.35 A patent protects the specific invention itself-the patented machine,
process, or matter-rather than the scientific discoveries, mathematical princi-
ples, or laws of nature underlying the invention. 36 Thus, competitors are free to
"invent around" the patent by devising a dissimilar device that performs the
same function in a different way.3 7 Design patents, which cover such things as
ornamental structures, have a life of fourteen years;38 utility patents, which
cover machines and other products and the processes used to develop them, last
seventeen years.
39
In the 1972 case of Gottschalk v. Benson4° the Supreme Court held unpat-
32. Similarly, with videogames, the display derives from interaction between the game program
and the user who constantly chooses among available options. Several courts have concluded that
the user's contribution does not undermine the copyright status of the game programs. Eg., Mid-
way Mfg. Co. v. Artie Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1011-12 (7th Cir. 1983); Stem Elecs., Inc. v. Kauf-
man, 669 F.2d 852, 855-56 (2d Cir. 1982). See generally Jones, Video Game Litigation and the 1976
Copyright Act: The Ideas of Games, The Expression ofAliens and the Underlying Computer Software,
1 J. CoPYRIGHT, ENTER. & SPORTS L. 17 (1982) (comprehensive review of videogame case law).
33. See Jones, supra note 32, at 18.
34. 5 U.S.C. § 101 (1982); see J. SOMA, supra note 2, § 2.03, at 26-27.
35. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271(a) (1982).
36. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182-84, 191-92 (1981). For a more general discussion of
patent coverage, see J. SOMA, supra note 2, §§ 2.03-.04, at 26-35; Davidson, supra note 7, at 348-59.
For a discussion of the economic factors involved in giving patent protection to software, see Note,
The Policy Implications of Granting Patent Protection to Computer Software: An Economic Analysis,
37 VAND. L. REv. 147 (1984).
37. See R. CHOATE & W. FRANcis, PATENT LAW 634-35 (2d ed. 1981).
38. 35 U.S.C. § 173 (1982); see J. SOMA, supra note 2, § 2.02, at 25.
39. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982); see 3. SOMA, supra note 2, § 2.02, at 25.
40. 409 U.S. 63 (1972). The Court sought to resolve conflicting decisions from the Patent and
Trademark Office and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. In 1968, the Patent Office took the
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entable a computerized process for converting binary-coded decimal numerals
into pure binary numerals. The Court reasoned that such a patent would grant
a monopoly on a mathematical algorithm, which was equivalent to a tradition-
ally unpatentable abstract intellectual concept. 4 1 In subsequent decisions the
Supreme Court held not patentable two other processes that used computer pro-
grams, but did not foreclose entirely the patenting of programs. 42 Most re-
cently, in Diamond v. Diehr,4 3 the Court held that an otherwise patentable
industrial process which employed a computer system to perform essential cal-
culations was not thereby rendered unpatentable.
These decisions suggest several observations about the patentability of com-
puter software. First, the Supreme Court seems to have left open whether com-
puter software standing alone, not tied in the patent application to a patentable
machine or process, constitutes patentable subject matter.44 There is post-Diehr
case support for both positions.45 Second, Diehr appears to suggest that other-
wise patentable processes will not be denied protection simply because they use
computer hardware and software.46 Similarly, software more likely will be pat-
entable if the claimed invention is described as a process in which the software is
applied.47 Last, these decisions do not undermine the patentability of computer
position that a computer program, whether claimed as a process or as part of an apparatus, was
unpatentable. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 197-98 (1981). In that same year, however, the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals issued two opinions that repudiated the longstanding legal
doctrines on which the Patent Office based its position. See In re Tarczy-Hornoch, 397 F.2d 856,
857 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (rejecting doctrine that process which amounted to nothing more than a de-
scription of the function of a machine was unpatentable); In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378, 1379
(C.C.P.A. 1968) (rejecting doctrine that processes which could be performed mentally were unpat-
entable), modified on reh'g, 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969). Then, in In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395,
1400-01 (C.C.P.A. 1969), the court reaffirmed Prater and also announced that apparatus patents
could be obtained for existing computers programmed in new and unobvious ways. Finally, in In re
Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 892-93 (C.C.P.A. 1970), the court again emphasized Prater's rejection of
the so-called "mental steps" doctrine and held that a computerized seismic interpretation process
was patentable. A sequence of operational steps was a patentable process, the court held, as long as
the process fell within the technological arts, regardless of whether it replicated a mental process. See
J. SOMA, supra note 2, § 2.03 at 29-30.
41. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67, 71-73; see J. SOMA, supra note 2, § 2.03, at 30.
42. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 0978); Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 229-30 0976).
43. 450 U.S. 175, 187-88, 191-93 0981); see J. SOMA, supra note 2, § 2.04, at 33-35. The Diehr
Court stated that "a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatu-
tory simply because it uses a mathematical formula, computer program, or digital computer. Diehr,
450 U.S. at 187.
44. See Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 71-72; J. SOMA, supra note 2, § 2.03, at 30-31.
45. Compare Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358, 1368-69 (D. Del. 1983) (data processing methodology for cash management
account held patentable subject matter in declaratory judgment action) (appeal pending) and In re
Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 916-917 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (reversing Patent and Trademark Office's rejection of
patent application for invention that converted computer from sequential processor to processor that
could receive program steps in any orders) and In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 907-09 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
(patent application claims directed to improvement in computer tomography patentable subject mat-
ter) and In re Taner, 681 F.2d 787 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (claims relating to method of seismic exploration
were patentable subject matter) with In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (claimed method of
replacing thinking processes of neurologist with computer not statutory subject matter). For an
analysis of the cases, see Milde, Life after Diamond v. Diehr: The CCPA Speaks Out on The Patent-
ability of Computer-Related Subject Matter, 64 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 434 (1982).
46. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187.
47. In Diehr the Supreme Court allowed patent application claims for a method of operating a
rubber-molding press. The method included constant measurement of the temperature data and
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hardware as machines. Thus, an invention described as a computer containing




In contrast to their uncertain status under patent law, copyright law clearly
protects computer programs embodied in source or object code. Under the
Copyright Act of 1976, copyright "subsists" in works of authorship and takes
effect on creation of the work.49 Copyright historically has applied to literary
works, works of art, music, and artistic performances. The definition of a
"copy" has been amended, however, to include works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium, even those that cannot be perceived without the aid of a
machine.sO This amendment appears to confirm that copyright may protect
both human-readable source code and machine-language object code; the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit so held in Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Franklin Computer Corp.5 1 Both systems and applications programs have been
held subject to copyright protection.
52
repeated calculation by a computer of a well-known mathematical formula incorporating the data.
Id. at 179-80 n.5.
In Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), the Court rejected a claim for a method of calculating a
temperature "alarm limit" at which a catalytic conversion process would be shut down. Id. at 585-
86. A computer was to perform the calculations that would be used in an industrial process, but the
patent claim itself merely recited and explained the formula. Id. at 596-98. The Court determined
that the only point of novelty was "a new and presumably better method for calculating alarm limit
values," id. at 594-95, and analogized the claim to an attempt to patent the formula used in calculat-
ing the circumference of a wheel. Id. at 595. In the Court's view, such a patent would grant a
monopoly on an uninventive application of a "phenomenon of nature or mathematical formula." Id.
at 594.
In Diehr the only novel aspect also was the improvement in the speed of calculating a well-
known equation in a standard industrial process. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 179. Arguably, the only distinc-
tion between the cases is that Diehr's claim described an improved industrial process that involved
computerized computations, whereas Flook's described only the computerized computations them-
selves. See Milde, supra note 45, at 435-39.
48. See Note, supra note 2, at 1733-35.
49. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
50. See id. In 1978, the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted
Works (CONTU), a commission created by Congress in Act of Dec. 31,1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88
Stat. 1373, recommended that copyright law be amended "to make it explicit that computer pro-
grams, to the extent that they embody an author's original creation, are proper subject matter of
copyright." CONTU REPORT, supra note 12, at 2. Congress adopted many of CONTU's recom-
mendations in amending the Copyright Act in 1980, in an attempt to clarify the copyright status of
computer software. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3028; see H.R. REP. No.
1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 6460, 6482. The
1980 amendments added a definition of "computer program" to § 101, repealed existing § 117, which
had made computer programs subject to legal principles developed under the 1909 Copyright Act,
and enacted a new § 117 to give "owners" of copies of computer programs limited authority to use,
adapt, or reproduce those copies for certain purposes. (CONTU had recommended that this author-
ity be extended to "rightful possessors" of copies; see CONTU REPORT, supra note 12, at 30). See J.
SOMA, supra note 2, § 2.07, at 41; infra notes 276-88 and accompanying text.
51. 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984). The Apple Com-
puter decision appears to have resolved with compelling logic a split of authority on the copyright
status of object code. See id. at 1247-49.
52. Id. at 1253-54; see also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 523 (9th
Cir. 1984) (operating system subject to copyright protection).
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Although documentation distributed with a program is subject to the same
copyright protection as other literary works, the protection of user languages is
wholly uncertain. On the one hand, it is clear that a document listing the ele-
ments of a language or describing the rules for its use is a copyrighted literary
work. On the other hand, if one merely uses the language, or even writes a
program that accepts an identical system of user commands, it is difficult to say
that the copyright in an indentifiable "work of authorship" has been infringed,
even if the result is the appropriation of something that the programmer views as
proprietary to him.
53
The copyright holder has the exclusive right to "reproduce the copyrighted
work in copies" and "to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work."'54 "Derivative work" is defined broadly to include subsequent works
"based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation. . . or any
other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. ' 55
The application of this apparently straightforward Copyright Act language
has been far from simple. For example, under the 1909 Copyright Act, which
did not reserve to the author the right to create derivative works, the word "cop-
ies" was construed to include paraphrases and works bearing a close structural
similarity to the copyrighted work, even though not using the original's actual
language.5 6 Although arguably obviated by the inclusion of the derivative work
concept, this broad interpretation of copying has persisted in cases under the
current Act.57 Moreover, copyright protects only expression, not the ideas be-
ing expressed.5 8 Drawing the line between idea and expression has proved to be
perhaps the most vexatious problem in the long history of copyright law.5 9
Taken literally, the current Copyright Act's definition of "derivative work"
appears to provide expansive protection. If the copyright holder has the exclu-
sive right to prepare works "based upon" or representing recastings, transforma-
tions, or adaptations of the original, 6° that right would prohibit virtually any
borrowing from the original in creating a subsequent work.6 1 Although this
53. Copyright protection for user languages is discussed infra notes 289-324 and accompanying
text.
54. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (2) (1982).
55. Id. § 101.
56. See Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686, 689-90
(S.D.N.Y.) (paraphrase of textbook), aff'd per curiam, 500 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1974); Donald v. Zack
Meyer's T.V. Sales & Serv., 426 F.2d 1027, 1030 (5th Cir. 1970) ("paraphrasing is equivalent to
outright copying"); Consolidated Music Publishers, Inc. v. Hanson Publications, Inc., 339 F. Supp.
1161, 1165 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (paraphrasing of text of guitar instruction book).
57. See Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 530 F. Supp. 1187, 1192-93
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (discussing "total concept and feel" of competing works); Synercom Tech., Inc. v.
University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1012-13 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (recognizing longstanding
doctrine that similarity in form, arrangement, and combination of literary elements may constitute
infringement).
58. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 101-05 (1879); 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
59. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][1] (1984).
60. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(2) (1982).
61. For example, a work borrowing its characters and its theme from an existing work plausibly
could be characterized as "based upon" the original. Borrowing at this level, however, usually has
been characterized as a permissible appropriation of ideas rather than expression. See, ag., Warner
Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 216 F.2d 945, 951-52 (9th Cir. 1954) (appropria-
[Vol. 63
COMPUTER SOFTWARE LITIGATION
expansive interpretation of derivative work may squarely conflict with the statu-
tory prohibition against extending copyright protection to ideas, 62 the courts
have given little guidance on whether the definition of derivative work is to be
applied literally.
63
The Copyright Act authorizes broad relief. The Act" and associated
Supreme Court rules65 provide for impounding infringing works before, during,
or after trial. The Act itself authorizes equitable relief "on such terms as [the
court] may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copy-
right.' ' 66 The Act also authorizes actual damages and disgorgement of an in-
fringer's profits,67 as well as statutory damages up to $50,000 for willful
violations 68 and reasonable attorneys' fees.
69
3. Trade Secret Protection
Neither patent nor copyright law protects pure knowledge or abstract con-
cepts. Both protect, in varying degrees, the expression, manifestation, and use of
ideas. Protection of knowledge and concepts is left largely to state trade secret
law.
The most widely cited definition of trade secret is articulated in comment b
to section 757 of the Restatement of Torts:
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compila-
tion of information which is used in one's business, and which gives
him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do
not know or use it.
70
The same comment states that "[t]he subject matter of a trade secret must be
secret."'71 The secrecy, however, need not be absolute; ."a substantial element of
secrecy must exist, so that, except by the use of improper means, there would be
difficulty in acquiring the information." 72 The Restatement suggests examining
tion of "Maltese Falcon" characters and theme), cert denied, 348 U.S. 971 (1955). The related
"scenes a faire" doctrine provides that if certain elements of plot and character development can be
expressed in only a limited number of ways, substantial similarity of expression is not necessarily
infringement. See Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, Inc., 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1976).
62. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 101-05 (1879); 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
63. Cf. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artie Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1013-14 (7th Cir. 1983) (exclusive
right to prepare derivative works extended to "speeded up" versions of copyrighted videogames).
64. 17 U.S.C. § 503(a) (1982).
65. Rules Adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States for Practice and Procedure
under Section 25 of an Act to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, approved
March 4, 1909, reprinted in 4 M. NIMMER, supra note 59, app. at 12.
66. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1982).
67. Id. § 504(a)(1), (b).
68. Id. § 504(a)(2), (c).
69. Id. § 505.
70. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b (1939). This section and other sections dealing
with business torts were not included in the Second Restatement. See also UNIFORM TRADE
SECRETS ACT, ABA SECTION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK, AND COPYRIGHT LAW, 1973 COMMITTEE
REPORTS 179-82, reprinted in 12A BusINESS ORGANIZATIONS, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS app. A
(1983) [hereinafter cited as MILGRIM].
71. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b (1939).
72. Id.
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six factors to determine whether particular information is a trade secret:
(1) The extent to which the information is known outside of his [the
proprietor's] business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees
and others involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken by
him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the infor-
mation to him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or
money expended by him in developing the information; (6) the ease or
difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or
duplicated by others. 73
Many courts have adopted these suggested factors.74 A few courts also have
required the purported trade secret to have an element of novelty.75
The following practices are among those employed to ensure the requisite
"substantial element of secrecy": requiring employees to sign employment
agreements acknowledging the confidentiality of certain information and prohib-
iting use of such information during employment and for a period of time after
termination of employment;76 safekeeping of confidential documents; 77 limiting
access by outsiders and all but necessary employees to confidential documents
and sensitive plant areas;78 disclosing sensitive information to third parties only
pursuant to written confidentiality agreements; 79 and monitoring security
breaches.80
Given the process by which it is created, a complex computer program ap-
pears eligible for trade secret protection.81 At every level of abstraction, the
programmer must make decisions that affect the ultimate success or failure of
the program. 82 To the extent that such decisions-are maintained in substantial
secrecy, they appear to constitute a "formula, pattern . . or compilation of
information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity
to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.' '83 Thus, to
the extent that copyright law may not protect the ideas and concepts that the
program embodies, trade secret law may.
Pursuant to section 757 of the Restatement, any person who uses or dis-
closes the trade secret of another is liable for misappropriation if "(a) he discov-
73. Id. § 757.
74. See 12 MILGRIM, supra note 70, § 2.01, at 2 n.2. For an application of the Restatement test
to alleged trade secrets in a computer program, see Cybertek Computer Prods., Inc. v. Whitfield, 203
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1620, 1023 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1977).
75. See,. g., Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson, 444 F.2d 1313, 1315 (5th Cir. 1971); Sarkes Tarzian,
Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250, 257-59 (S.D. Cal. 1958), aff'd, 283 F.2d 695 (9th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 869 (1961).
76. See Lowndes Prod., Inc. v. Brower, 259 S.C. 322, 329-30, 191 S.E.2d 761, 765-66 (1972); 12
MILGRIM, supra note 70, § 3.01.
77. See 12 MILGRIM, supra note 70, § 2.04; 12A MILGRIM, supra note 70, § 7.07I][a].
78. See 12 MILGRIM, supra note 70, § 2.04.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See Cybertek Computer Prods., Inc. v. Whitfield, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1020, 1022 (Cal.
Super. CL 1977); Keplinger, Computer Software-Its Nature and Its Protection, 30 EMORY L.J. 483,
492 (1981) (citing 12 MILGRIM, supra note 70, §§ 2.06, 2.09[A]; Duncan, supra note 7, at 395-400).
82. See supra notes 2-20 and accompanying text.
83. RESTATEMENT OF ToRTS § 757, comment b (1939).
[Vol. 63
COMPUTER SOFTWARE LITIGATION
ered the secret by improper means, or (b) the disclosure or use constitutes a
breach of confidence reposed in him by the other in disclosing the secret to
him."'8 4 Acquisition by improper means usually occurs through industrial espi-
onage or breach of a confidential relationship.8 5 Disclosure in breach of a confi-
dential relationship may occur when a partner uses the trade secret of a
partnership for personal advantage,8 6 or when an employee or other party to
whom a trade secret has been disclosed for business reasons uses the secret in
violation of an express87 or implied confidentiality agreement.88 Significantly, it
is not a defense that a competitor might have learned the protected information
from lawfully acquired sources; the relevant inquiiy is what the defendant did,
not what someone else might have done.
89
When trade secret protection is sought for computer programs that are
widely distributed to users, there is an inherent tension between the requirement
of secrecy and the fact of distribution. Wide distribution of software does not
foreclose trade secret protection, as long as each recipient is party to an agree-
ment that creates a confidential relationship and substantially limits disclosure
of those aspects of the software deemed proprietary. 90 Thus, software generally
is distributed only pursuant to license agreements. 91 Software license agree-
ments typically define broadly the trade secrets that the program embodies, re-
quire the licensee to acknowledge the existence and protected status of those
trade secrets, prohibit use or disclosure of the software beyond what is necessary
to carry out the product's intended purpose, and prohibit copying of the
software or any accompanying documentation except for legitimate backup
purposes.
92
Courts formulating remedies in trade secret cases tend to follow general
principles of equity.93 In part because the products often are complex, the cases
are difficult to reconcile and offer little help to a lawyer attempting to predict the
84. Id. § 757.
85. See, e.g., E.I. DuPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970) (aerial
photography of unfinished plant); Forest Labs., Inc. v. Formulations, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 202 (E.D.
Wis. 1969) (use of trade secrets that were disclosed in confidence), rev'd in part sub nom. Forest
Labs., Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1971).
86. See 12 MILGRIM, supra note 70, § 5.03[7].
87. See id. § 3.051].
88. See id. § 3.03.
89. See K & G Oil Tool & Serv. Co. v. G & G Fishing Tool Serv., 158 Tex. 594, 602-03, 314
S.W.2d. 782, 787-88 (citing Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 374 (7th Cir. 1953)), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 898 (1958).
90. See J & K Computer Sys., Inc. v. Parrish, 642 P.2d 732, 735 (Utah 1982) (citing Grace v.
Orkin Exterminating Co., 255 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953)); cf. Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend
Elecs., [1984] COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 25,579 (D. Nev. Apr. 26, 1984) (distinguishing J & K
and finding no trade secret because of unrestricted distribution).
91. In J & K Computer Sys. v. Parrish, 642 P.2d 732 (Utah 1982), plaintiff informed its em-
ployees and customers that its accounts receivable program was secret and noted on each copy of the
program that it could be used only when authorized by license. Because of these measures, the court
found the program protectible even though its contents were revealed to certain customers. Id. at
735.
92. See 1 D. BENDER, supra note 2, § 4A.07[1].
93. See, e.g., Bridge C.A.T. Scan Assocs. v. Technicare Corp., 710 F.2d 940, 946 (2d Cir. 1983);
K & G Oil Tool & Serv. Co. v. G & G Fishing Tool Serv., 158 Tex. 594, 606, 314 S.W.2d 782, 790
0958).
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outcome of his own case.94 It is particularly difficult to predict when one who
has misappropriated a trade secret will be enjoined from distributing a product
that allegedly embodies it.95 Even when a court issues such an injunction, the
length of time it is to remain in effect and the scope of its coverage are difficult
problems that are resolved on a case-by-case basis.96 These difficulties are exac-
erbated when the trade secret has been made public by legitimate means after
the alleged misappropriation but before trial,9 7 or when the defendant can
demonstrate that the product sought to be enjoined uses both the misappropri-
ated trade secret and his original contributions.98
Finally, possible preemption of trade secret protection for software must be
considered. Section 301(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976 provides:
[A]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106
in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expres-
sion and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by
sections 102 and 103 . are governed exclusively by this title ....
No person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such
work under the common law or statutes of any State. 99
Section 301(b)(1) further provides that "[n]othing in this title annuls or limits
any rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any State with
respect to . . . subject matter that does not come within the subject matter of
copyright . . . ."1 Section 301(b)(3) also excludes from preemption "activi-
ties violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of the exclu-
sive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106."101
Although the courts have not yet construed section 301 definitively, 10 2 the lan-
94. Compare Shellmar Prods. Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co., 87 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1936) (wrongdoer
may be enjoined permanently from use or disclosure even though a subsequently issued patent makes
the information public) with Schreyer v. Caseo Prods. Corp., 190 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1951) (disclosure in
patent precludes liability for use of information after patent issued) and Conmar Prods. Corp. v.
Universal Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1949) (injunction can remain in effect only as long
as trade secret remains secret).
95. Courts in trade secret and patent cases sometimes refuse injunctions that would harm dis.
proportionately the infringer. P. GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED
STATE DocuRINEsCAsEs AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 159
(1981); see eg., Forest Labs, Inc. v. Formulations, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 202 (E.D. Wis. 1969) (damages
sufficient to compensate plaintiff when trade secret process had been made public by declarations in
plaintiff's patent), rev'd in part sub nom. Forest Labs, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621 (7th Cir.
1971).
96. See supra note 95; see also Head Ski Co. v. Kam Ski Co., 158 F. Supp. 919 (D. Md. 1958)
(broad injunction necessary when entire operation was built on plaintiff's techniques, methods,
materials, and design).
97. See Forest Labs., Inc. v. Formulations, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 202, 211 (E.D. Wis. 1969), rey'd
in part sub nom. Forest Labs, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1971).
98. See Head Ski Co. v. Kam Ski Co., 158 F. Supp. 919, 923-24 (D. Md. 1958).
99. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982).
100. Id. § 301(b)(1).
101. Id. § 301(b)(3).
102. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has construed 17 U.S.C. § 301
(1982) in dictum to preempt previous law and "replace the labyrinth of statutory and common law
authority with a single, generally applicable federal statute." Roth v. Pritikin, 710 F.2d 934, 938 (2d
Cir.), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 393 (1983). Prior to the 1976 Act, the Supreme Court had held that the
Copyright Clause in the United States Constitution did not vest in the federal government the exclu-
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guage and legislative history of the section suggest that it was intended to abro-
gate only the common law of copyright.10 3 Accordingly, common-law
protection should remain available for ideas and concepts, which are excluded
specificially from federal copyright protection.1 4
A series of Supreme Court decisions on the interaction of federal patent law
and state trade secret and unfair competition law supports this interpretation.
Between 1964 and 1974 the Court expressed and then retreated from the view
that state law could not protect unpatentable inventions because they were in the
public domain.' 0 5 In the most recent of these decisions, the Court concluded
that "the patent policy of encouraging invention is not disturbed by the existence
of another form of incentive to invention. In this respect the two systems [pat-
ent and trade secret law] are not and never would be in conflict.'
' 0 6
4. Summary
Every computer program includes source and/or object code in which a
copyright subsists. There is no persuasive reason not to take the procedural
steps necessary to take full advantage of Copyright Act protection. Since a
software developer will also likely claim proprietary rights in intellectual contri-
butions other than writing code, he should complement copyright with licensing
and other forms of trade secret protection. Nonetheless, in cases involving al-
leged misappropriation of a program, copyright infringement is likely to be a
major issue. The remainder of this Article discusses some of the specific
problems likely to be encountered in computer copyright litigation.
II. PROCEDURAL PREREQUISITES TO COPYRIGHT LITIGATION
A plaintiff attempting to prove copyright infringement must meet certain
procedural prerequisites and then prove the required substantive elements. Pro-
cedurally, the plaintiff must have registered the copyright 10 7 and, if not the
copyright's original owner, have recorded the instrument of transfer vesting the
copyright in the plaintiff. s0 8 The plaintiff must have standing' 0 9 and must have
sive power to grant protection in the nature of copyright. In Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546
0973), the Court held that a California statute designed to prohibit record piracy did not violate the
Supremacy Clause by conflicting with federal copyright law. Id. at 561-70. For a general discussion
of the preemptive effect of the 1976 Copyright Act on the common law of trade secrets, see Video-
tronics, Inc. v. Bend Elecs., [1984] COPYRIGHT L. DEc. (CCH) % 25,579 (D. Nev. Apr. 26, 1984);
Davidson, supra note 7, at 407-1.
103. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 129-33, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5659, 5745-49.
104. See Davidson, supra note 7, at 407-09.
105. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,484 (1974); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230-33
(1964).
106. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974).
107. See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1982).
108. See Burns v. Rockwood Distrib. Co., 481 F. Supp. 841, 846-47 (N.D. Ilil. 1979); 17 U.S.C.
§ 205(d) (1982); 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 59, § 12.08.
109. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 59, § 12.02.
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brought the action within the appropriate statute of limitations.' 10 Finally, the




1. Registration and Recordation
The plaintiff may not initiate an action for copyright infringement until he
has registered the work in the Copyright Office,113 or at least attempted to regis-
ter and been refused. 114 Registration requires submission of an application, a
small fee, and a "deposit" of two complete copies of the "best edition" of the
work.1 15 The Copyright Office prefers the deposit of a computer program's
source code, but will accept object code under the so-called rule of doubt. 16 In
either case, "special relief" may be available to protect the confidentiality of
trade secret materials.
1 17
Registration is only a prerequisite to initiating the action, not the existence
or validity of the copyright. 118 Thus, once the plaintiff has registered or at-
temped to register the copyright, he may sue for infringements that occurred
both prior to and after registration. 19 If the plaintiff is not the author of the
work, he also must record in the copyright office the instrument of transfer
under which he asserts ownership of the right allegedly infringed. 120
2. Standing to Sue
The owner of the copyright and any assignee or exclusive licensee of any
110. See 17 U.S.C. § 507 (1982).
111. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1982); 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 59, § 12.01[A]-[B].
112. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 59, § 12.01[C].
113. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1982).
114. Id. A plaintiff has made a sufficient attempt to register if he has delivered the deposit,
application, and fee in proper form to the Copyright Office, which has refused registration. See id.
115. See id. §408.
116. The Copyright Office states that its examiners dannot determine whether copyrightable au-
thorship exists by reviewing object code. See Copyright Office Literary Section Code Letter 70;
Copyright Circular Rbl. Since the Copyright Act specifically extends protection to works of author-
ship that can be perceived "either directly or with the aid of a machine or device," 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)
(1982), this positon may be an unwarranted administrative narrowing of the scope of copyright pro-
tection. See also id. § 410(a)-(b) (Copyright Office either must issue or refuse registration.).
When a computer program has been published in the United States in machine-readable form
only, the Office will accept a deposit of "identifying portions" in lieu of the complete work, 37
C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(vii) (1984). Such materials must be in a "form visually perceptible without the
aid of a machine," and usually must include the first and last 25 pages of the program equivalent
material. Id.; see also id. § 202.19(5) (no Library of Congress deposit required for programs pub-
lished in machine-readable form only).
117. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(d) (1984). If source code is deposited under the "identifying materi-
als" provision, the materials deposited should be able to be organized to exclude trade secrets.
118. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 201(a) (1982) provide that copyright vests in the author of the work
when the work is fixed in any tangible medium of expression.
119. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 59, § 12.08.
120. See 17 U.S.C. § 205(d) (1982). The statutory language appears to require that only the most
immediate instrument of transfer be recorded and not other instruments in the chain of title to the
author. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 59, § 12.08.
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right arising out of the copyright all have standing to sue to the extent of their
respective interests at the time of infringement.1 2 1 A nonexclusive licensee does
not have standing to sue and must rely on his licensor to initiate the action.'
22
Under the current Copyright Act, the owner of a copyright may assign or
grant an exclusive license in some, but not all, of the rights arising out of the
copyright, and thus, multiple parties may have protected rights in a single work
that was infringed only once.' 23 A plaintiff should identify specifically the right
infringed and the date of infringement to demonstrate that he is the appropriate
party to bring the suit.
3. Statute of Limitations
The plaintiff must initiate any action for copyright infringement within
three years of the date on which the claim accrued. 124 Since the claim does not
accrue until the infringement actually occurs, the plaintiff must identify specifi-
cally the act or acts that constitute infringement. 125 If an act of infringement
occurred within the prior three years, a suit for damages arising out of that act
will not be barred, even if the statute of limitations does bar a suit for other,
earlier infringements of the same work by the same party.
126
Any equitable ground recognized under federal law, such as estoppel127 or
fraudulent concealment, may toll the limitation period.' 28 A state tolling statute
in the jurisdiction of the action, however, is not sufficient to toll the statute.'
29
4. Jurisdiction
The federal district courts have exclusive original subject matter jurisdic-
tion over actions for the infringement of a statutory copyright. 130 The state
courts have jurisdiction over actions to enforce, invalidate, or rescind contracts,
as well as actions for breach of warranty, even though the validity of a copyright
or the existence of infringement may be an issue.131 State courts also have juris-
121. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 59, § 12.02. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) 1982) provides only that the
"legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright" may sue. The section defines an
"exclusive right" as including the rights of a copyright holder set out in § 106.
122. See Hoffman v. Santly-Joy, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 779, 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); 3 M. NIMMER, supra
note 59, § 12.02.
123. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (1982). This section is the first explicit statutory recognition of the
principle of divisibility of copyright. Id., Historical and Revision Notes.
124. See id. § 507.
125. See Hoste v. Radio Corp. of Am., 654 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1981); 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 59,
§ 12.05.
126. See Mount v. Book-of-the-Month Club, Inc., 555 F.2d 1108, 1111 (2d Cir. 1977); Rosette v.
Rainbo Record Mfg. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1183, 1194 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
127. See Herald Square Music Co. v. Living Music, Inc., 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1241 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); M. NIMMER, supra note 59, § 12.05.
128. See Mount v. Book-of-the-Month Club, Inc., 555 F.2d 1108, 1112 (2d Cir. 1977).
129. See Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 446 F.2d 338, 339-40 (5th Cir. 1971).
130. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1982) provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copy-
rights and trademarks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent, plant
variety protection, and copyright cases."
131. See Condon v. Associated Hosp. Serv., 287 N.Y. 411, 40 N.E.2d 230 (1942); 3 M. NIMMER,
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diction over any other claims for the infringement of common-law copyright. 132
In determining whether it has personal jurisdiction over the defendant in an
infringement action, a court will apply general principles of federal
jurisdiction.
133
III. SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN COMPUTER COPYRIGHT CASES
A. Infringement Generally
The two classic elements of a copyright infringement case are the validity of
the copyright and the existence of copying.1 34 A copyright is valid if the work is
appropriate copyright subject matter 135 and an original work of authorship.
1 36
Registration of the copyright and issuance of the registration certificate within
five years after the work's first publication is prima facie evidence of the validity
of the copyright and the facts stated in the certificate. 137 The court may, but is
not required to, give evidentiary weight to a certificate of registration first re-
corded more than five years after the work's first publication. 138 Once the plain-
tiff establishes prima facie proof of the validity of the copyright, the burden
shifts to the defendant.
1 39
As noted earlier, a computer program in source- or object-code form,
whether stored on a tape, disk, ROM, or other medium, is subject to copyright
protection. 14 Both systems and applications programming are protected, and
the user's interaction with the program and contribution to the output should
not affect the protection.
14 1
Direct evidence of copying, by admission or eyewitness testimony, is often
unavailable. 142 Thus, courts have long allowed copying to be proved circum-
stantially by showing access to the infringed work and substantial similarity be-
supra note 59, § 12.01[A]. Cf Cresci v. Music Publishers Holding Corp., 210 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y.
1962) (federal court does not have jurisdiction over action to determine ownership of copyright),
132. See Simon & Flynn, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 513 F.2d 832, 834 (2d Cir. 1975); Hearst Corp. v.
Shopping Center Network, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 551, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Common-law copyrights,
by definition, do not arise under the Copyright Act. Since no common-law copyright can arise for
any work created after January 1, 1978, it is unlikely that common-law copyright will be an issue in
future computer program cases.
133. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 59, § 12.0][C].
134. See id. § 13.01.
135. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102-105 (1982); see 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 59, § 13.01[A].
136. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (1982); see 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 59, § 13.01[A].
137. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1982).
138. See id.
139. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 59, § 13.01[A].
140. See, ag., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984); Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct.
690 (1984).
141. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Frankin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249-54 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009,
1011-12 (7th Cir. 1983); Stem Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855-57 (2d Cir. 1982).
142. Direct evidence of copying a computer program, however, may be more readily available.
See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1245 (3d Cir. 1983) (defend-
ant admitted copying each work for which infringement alleged), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690
(1984). See infra notes 324-50 and accompanying text; supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
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tween the original and allegedly infringing works. 14 3 It usually is not difficult to
demonstrate access. The defendant may admit it, or may be shown to be a pur-
chaser or licensee of the program. 144 In some cases, the court may presume
access if the plaintiff's work is readily available on the market. 145 Defining sub-
stantial similarity, however, has proved to be one of the most difficult problems
in cases dealing with literary works. The problem promises only to become ex-
acerbated in the computer context.
B. Proving Substantial Similarity
Generally, the substantial similarity test "is whether the accused work is so
similar to the plaintiff's work that an ordinary reasonable person would con-
clude that the defendant unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff's protectible ex-
pression by taking material of substance and value."' 146 As another court has
put it, substantial similarity exists when "an average lay observer would recog-
nize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted
work." 147
1. The Standard for Evaluating Similarity
Most courts determining whether two works are substantially similar have
evaluated them from the perspective of the hypothetical ordinary lay observer;
"analytic dissection" and expert testimony generally are not favored for this
purpose. 148 Other courts, particularly the United States Courts of Appeals for
the Third and Ninth Circuits, have applied the following two-pronged in-
quiry:149 First, is there enough similarity to infer that the defendant copied at
all? Second, is the copying extensive enough to constitute a misappropriation of
the plaintiff's work?150 Under this approach, dissection is permitted in answer-
ing the first question but the second is answered from the perspective of the
143. See Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1983); Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 654
F.2d. 204, 207 (2d Cir. 1981).
144. See Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp. 672 F.2d. 607, 614 (7th
Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1983).
145. See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125,146 (D.N.J. 1982); cf. Selle
v. Gibb, No. 83-2482 (7th Cir. July 23, 1984) (striking similarity may be circumstantial evidence of
access).
146. Atari, Inc v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1983).
147. Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 829 (11th Cir. 1982).
148. See Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d. 607, 614 (7th
Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1983).
149. See Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 863 0975); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125,138 (D.N.J. 1982). The
Ninth Circuit sometimes has varied this approach, requiring an "extrinsic" or "objective" showing
that the two works are similar in idea, and then an "intrinsic" or "subjective" showing that they are
similar in expression. See Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1356-57 (9th Cir. 1984); Sid & Marty
Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162-64 (9th Cir. 1977); cf.
Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 1982) (in
videogame case, court refers to two-part test, but focuses inquiry on reaction of ordinary lay ob-
server), cert denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1983).
150. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, 546 F. Supp. 125, 138 (D.N.J. 1982).
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ordinary lay observer. 15 1 With either approach, the courts permit expert testi-
mony and dissection on the issue of whether the misappropriated portions of the
plaintiff's work are subject to copyright protection.152
The process of proof is relatively straightforward in the typical literary case.
The competing works are put before the trier of fact who, assisted by descriptive
testimony, determines such things as the extent of line-by-line copying and the
overall similarity of the two works.153 Expert testimony may be introduced on
such specific issues as whether the plaintiff's work merely restates mathematical
formulas, laws of nature, or other matters in the public domain.
15 4
It is difficult, if not impossible, to apply these standard copyright principles
to a computer case, primarily because an ordinary lay observer often is incapable
of comparing line by line two sets of computer source or object code. In the rare
case of verbatim copying the ordinary lay observer might be able to detect it
simply by comparing the two sets of code side by side.155 Such relatively minor
changes as the translation of the plaintiff's code from one computer language to
another or the reversal of the order in which a program carries out certain calcu-
lations, however, may render the two works materially dissimilar to the lay ob-
server. Because either of these changes could be made mechanically and neither
change necessarily would vitiate copyright liability,156 the ordinary-lay-observer
standard may have limited utility in computer cases.1 57 In several cases, the
trier of fact determining source code similarity therefore has relied on otherwise
disfavored expert testimony and analytic dissection. 158
151. Id.
152. Id.; see also Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607,
615 (7th Cir. 1982) (If the works are similar only in an abstract idea not subject to copyright protec-
tion, there is no substantial similarity or infringement.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1983).
153. Kg., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.) (Judge Learned Hand
discusses copyright protection of play), cert denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936).
154. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
155. Kg., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1245 (3d Cir. 1983)
(copying admitted), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984).
156. See Synercom Tech., Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 n.5 (N.D.
Tex. 1978).
157. If such mechanical changes rendered the competing works superficially dissimilar, the lay
observer would be unable to draw reasonable inferences about common origin.
158. The legal significance of alleged but disputed source-code similarity was litigated in SAS
Institute, Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., Nos. 82-3669 & 82-3670 (M.D. Tenn. filed July 30 & 31,
1982) (consolidation of separately filed cross-actions), which was tried by Professor Conley, one of
the authors of this Article. SAS Institute alleged that a new S & H product infringed its copyright
and that S & H had violated a license agreement in creating the product. S & H challenged the
validity of SAS Institute's copyright, denying both breach of the license and copying. The court
summarized the facts in a partial summary judgment order of July 25, 1983, which dealt with the
license issues and the copyright status of an earlier version of the product that allegedly was copied.
S & H Computer Sys. v. SAS Institute, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 416 (M.D. Tenn. 1983). The copyright
issues were tried to the court in September 1983, and a decision recently was handed down. See
infra notes 364-79 and accompanying text. At trial, each side presented testimony from several
experts, both in-house and independent, on whether certain similarities in the source codes of the
two products supported an inference of copying.
The United States International Trade Commission also relied on expert testimony on the sig-
nificance of source code similarity in Certain Personal Computers and Components, [1984] Copy-
RIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) % 25,651 (ITC Mar. 9, 1984). The Commission heard expert testimony on
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2. How Much Similarity is Enough?
There are no reported decisions in which a court has judged the substantial-
ity of alleged but contested similarities between two sets of computer source
code.15 9 In perhaps the most widely publicized computer copyright case, Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,160 copying was admitted, and in the
frequently cited case of Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing
Co.,161 the similarity at issue was between elements of input and output. Thus,
to determine how much similarity is "substantial" in a software case, it is neces-
sary to begin with principles developed in other contexts. First, "[ain infringe-
ment is not confined to literal and exact repetition or reproduction; it includes
also the various modes in which the matter of any work may be adopted, imi-
tated, transferred, or reproduced, with more or less colorable alterations to dis-
guise the piracy."'16 2 The defendant's work need only "have captured the 'total
concept and feel'" of the plaintiff's work.
163
Second, substantial similarity does not require literal, line-by-line identity;
as Judge Learned Hand put it,
We have often decided that a play may be pirated without using the
dialogue. . . . The play is the sequence of the confluents of all these
means [all the elements of the story and performance], bound together
in an inseparable unity; it may often be most effectively pirated by leav-
ing out the speech, for which a substitute can be found, which keeeps
the whole dramatic meaning.164
Thus, one who borrows only the content and sequence of the scenes in the play,
whether certain source code similarities constituted "substantial similarity," and ultimately issued an
order banning the importation of several computer products. Id. at 18,931-32.
Other software infringement cases in which expert testimony was permitted on various issues
include Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 876 n.6 (3d Cir. 1982) (evidence of
copyright notice buried in object code, object code identity, and presence of identical errors in com-
peting programs); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 752-53 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (evidence
of object code identity); and Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Management Assistance Inc., [1984] Copy-
RiGHT L. DEc. (CCH) 25,529 (D. Idaho Feb. 3, 1983) (evidence of defendant's creation of infring-
ing copy as step in the operation of its product).
159. See supra note 158; cf. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 752-53 (N.D. Ill.
1983) (evidence showed 89% identity at object code level; court found similarity to be substantial).
In a number of cases involving videogame programs, the courts have considered substantial similar-
ity, but have focused on the similarity of the displays produced by the program rather than the
programs themselves. See, eg., Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, 704 F.2d. 1009, (7th Cir. 1983)
(audio and video images produced by videogame programs "virtually the same"), cert denied, 104 S.
Ct. 690 (1984); Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d. 607, 608
(7th Cir. 1982) (video images produced by videogame programs, "uniquely similar"), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 880 (1983).
160. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984).
161. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
162. Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1947); see also
Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 618 (7th Cir. 1982)
("exact reproduction"), cert denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1983).
163. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167 (9th
Cir. 1977) (quoting Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970));
see Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 361 (9th Cir. 1947).
164. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 55-56 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298
U.S. 669 (1936).
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thereby replicating its "dramatic meaning," may infringe the copyright in the
play.
Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. 165 illustrates the flexibility
of the substantial similarity doctrine. Plaintiff published a leading psychology
textbook. Defendant initially identified plaintiff's book as the leader in the field
and decided to use it as a model. 166 Defendant's employees then scrutinized
plaintiff's book and outlined it in detail.' 67 This outline was given to a second
group of employees who did not have access to plaintiff's work. 168 This group
wrote a book that directly plagiarized only eleven percent of plaintiff's book and
contained "some independent ideas,. . . some independent research, some addi-
tional topics, and some differing structure." 169 Notwithstanding the originality
and the insulation of defendant's actual writers from plaintiff's book, the court
found infringement in the form of "an extensive taking of the structure and topi-
cal sequence of the [plaintiff's] book in addition to the eleven percent of the
[plaintiff's] book admittedly plagiarized." 170
Third, courts regularly have focused on the overall pattern of similarity; if
the similarity is pervasive, differences in detail may be viewed as immaterial.
The test most frequently cited is whether "the ordinary observer, unless he set
out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, and regard
their aesthetic appeal as the same." 17 1 In yet another of his sibylline dicta,
Judge Learned Hand put it more succinctly: "[No plagiarist can excuse the
wrong by showing how much of his work he did not pirate." 172 The rationale
for the rule, Judge Hand noted elsewhere, is that otherwise "a plagiarist would
escape by immaterial variations."'
173
No quantitative or other precise standards govern the determination of sub-
stantial similarity. Courts have made determinations for such diverse works as
dolls, 174 fabrics, 175 textbooks, 176 and plays and movies. 177 These courts have
been consistent in only one point: if it would be unmistakably clear to a lay
observer that the defendant used the plaintiff's work as an explicit and compre-
165. 378 F. Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y.) (preliminary injunction granted), aff'd, 500 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir.
1974), permanent injunction granted, 413 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
166. Meredith Corp., 413 F. Supp. at 385.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 387.
170. Id. at 386.
171. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960); see
Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
172. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d. 49, 56 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S.
669 (1936).
173. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S.
902 (1931).
174. Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821 (11th Cir. 1982).
175. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960).
176. Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y.) (prelimi-
nary injunction granted), aff'd, 500 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1974), permanent injunction granted, 413 F.
Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).




hensive model for the defendant's work, regardless of the details of comparison,
the works are substantially similar.
The fourth point is a corollary of the third. Just as a plagiarist cannot
excuse himself by showing how much he did not copy, neither can he excuse
himself by demonstrating that he has made independent contributions to his
otherwise infringing work. Substantial similarity is only circumstantial evidence
of copying, which can be overcome by proving that the accused work was cre-
ated independently and that the similarity is merely incidental.' 78 The similar-
ity, however, must be incidental to the independent creation; minor independent
creation incidental to comprehensive similarity will not exonerate the defendant.
The Meredith Corp. court rejected a defense based on the inclusion of "some
independent ideas,. . . research,. . . topics,. . . and. . . structure," finding
that despite these contributions the overall similarity of the works was sufficient
to support an inference of copying. 179 Moreover, that the plagiarist has ex-
pended substantial time and effort is irrelevant. In a recent videogame case, the
court rejected evidence offered by the defendants of "independent creation of the
physical elements of their games."' 8 0 Such evidence, the court concluded, "de-
picts only creation, not independent creation."' 18 As the court noted somewhat
tartly, "even the infringer who traces the outline of another's work must move
his own hand across the page."
18 2
Last, substantiality also has a qualitative aspect. As a federal judge exper-
ienced in copyright matters recently pointed out to one of the authors, a finding
of substantial similarity to the works of Shakespeare would seem unwarranted if
the alleged plagiarist had copied only a single line from the vast Shakespearean
corpus. If, however, that line happened to be "a rose by any other name would
smell as sweet,"' 83 it would be reasonable to conclude that the plagiarist had
appropriated something of real substance.
Although the focus in most cases is on quantitative comparison, 184 some
courts have recognized the significance of qualitative similarity. One district
court stated that including some of Charlie Chaplin's "best scenes" in an infring-
ing film would support a finding of substantial similarity even if the quantitative
similarity was limited.185 As the trial judge in that case put it, "I would think
178. Cf. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 147 n.22 (D.N.J. 1982)
(court rejected claim of independent creation of videogames).
179. Meredith Corp., 413 F. Supp. at 387.
180. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-American, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 147 n.72 (D.NJ. 1982).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, act II, scene ii.
184. See, eg., Meredith Corp., 413 F. Supp. at 387 (11% of textbook); Certain Personal Com-
puter and Components, 1984] COPYRIGHT L. DEc. (CCH) % 25,651 at 18,931-32 (ITC March 9,1984)
(line-by-line quantitative comparison of computer source code similarities); see also 3 M. NIMMER,
supra note 59, § 13.03[A][2], at 13-36 to -37 (discussing difficulty of determining quantum of "frag-
mented literal similarity" allowable).
185. Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),
af'd, 672 F.2d. 1095 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982); see also Universal Pictures Co. v.
Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 361 (9th Cir. 1947) (" '[If... the labors of the original author
are substantially, to an injurious extent, appropriated by another, that is enough to constitute in-
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there would be a substantial taking of Gone with the Wind if somebody just took
the burning of Atlanta."
' 18 6
These five considerations arguably are mere variations on the pervasive
theme of idea versus expression. Most copyright cases in which some degree of
similarity is found ultimately are resolved by determining whether the demon-
strated resemblances lie in the realm of idea or expression.18 7 Whether the
works are similar enough to prove infringement, for example, is related to
whether the similarities are sufficiently detailed to prove misappropriation of
expression. Similarly, qualitative similarity is significant because a single line
("a rose by any other name would smell as sweet," "the quality of mercy is not
strained," for example) indeed can capture the essence of an author's expression.
The plagiarist should not be exculpated by having included original expression
in his infringing work since the more pertinent question is whether he has appro-
priated another's expression.
Substantial similarity and its permutations, although perhaps analytically
neat, have been imprecise at best in application.188 Although there is little or no
precedent,' 89 this imprecision only will be compounded when courts consider
computer programs rather than literary works.
Judges and jurors will be comparing works written in a language and idiom
incomprehensible to most of them. Absent identity of the competing works,
expert opinion inevitably will guide the determination of similarity. 190
Although courts can mitigate the problem by appointing their own experts, 19 1 in
many instances they may have to rely uncritically on the application by partisan
experts of a legal concept-substantial similarity-to the facts.19 2 If judges and
jurors cannot evaluate the overall similarity of computer programs, then they
will have even more trouble determining whether a particular dissimilarity is
fringement.' ") (quoting West Publishing Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 169 F. 833, 854 (E.D.N.Y.
1909)).
186. Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),
aff'd, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
187. Eg., Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.
1982) (videogames), cert denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1983); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v.
McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977) (cartoon characters).
188. Compare, for example, the district and appellate court opinions in Atari, Inc. v. North
American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1265 (M.D. Inl. 1981), rey'd, 672 F.2d
607 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1983), in which the courts compared two videogames.
Much of what the court of appeals found to be borrowing of expression had been found to be bor-
rowing of ideas by the district court. See generally Jones, supra note 33 (discussing difficulty of
distinguishing idea from expression in videogames).
189. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
190. See, eg., Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 618-
19 n.12 (7th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1983).
191. In S & H Computer Sys. v. SAS Inst., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 416 (M.D. Tenn. 1983), the court
retained a statistical computing expert from Vanderbilt University who was nominated and paid
jointly by the parties. He attended the pretrial hearings, conferences, and trial. Prior to trial, the
experts for the two sides submitted written reports to him.
192. In a literary case, the trier of fact can examine generally the competing works, with or
without the aid of experts, and make a largely subjective judgment whether any observed similarity
is "substantial." If the very act of observing the competing works is meaningless to the trier of fact,
the court may have to delegate to the experts not only observing the works and identifying similari-
ties, but also the ultimate determination of whether such similarities are "substantial."
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exculpatory, evaluating the importance of an alleged infringer's independent
contributions, and assessing the qualitative significance of a portion of a pro-
gram. Overall, the trier of fact is likely to have great difficulty determining
where in the programming process the boundary between idea and expression
lies.
It will be argued in section V of this Article that the Copyright Act above
all is a statute proscribing certain behavior. Thus, if the ordinary-lay-observer
test is obsolete in computer cases, the focus should shift from the appearance of
the competing works to the alleged infringer's actual behavior. Given the itera-
tive nature of the programming process and the record-keeping it often engen-
ders, evidence of the defendant's behavior is likely to be more extensive and
better preserved than in the typical literary case.19 3 Expert testimony can be
used to prove whether the defendant engaged in any conduct prohibited by the
Act rather than to evaluate substantial similarity. Before this argument is devel-
oped, the intervening sections will review several other general principles of
copyright law that have assumed particular importance in computer cases.
C. The Identity of Idea and Expression
"Where idea and expression are indistinguishable, the copyright will pro-
tect against only identical copying. . . . 'The idea and the expression will coin-
cide when the expression provides nothing new or additional over the idea.' "194
If the idea and its expression are interwined so closely that the particular idea
can be expressed in only one form, copyright protection is vitiated.
195
The "idea-expression defense" originated in Baker v. Selden,196 a case in
which the Supreme Court held that a copyright in a book describing a bookkeep-
ing system did not preclude use of the system itself, even if that use required
reproduction of charts and forms in the book. The Court reasoned that the idea
of the system was inseparable from the expression of the idea in certain book-
keeping forms; to protect the forms therefore would preempt use of the sys-
tem. 197 Lower courts have recognized the defense in rejecting claims of
193. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. Earlier versions of the defendant's program,
for example, may repeat errors present in the plaintiffs program. See McClure & Sher, Evaluating
Claims of Software Copying Through Data Analysis (Part I), 3 SOFTWARE PROTECTION 8, 10-11
(July 1984).
194. Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th Cir.
1982) (quoting Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1168 (9th Cir. 1977)), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1983).
195. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 59, § 1303[A][1], at 13-32-33. To protect the expression in
such cases would preempt the idea being expressed. Eg., Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379
F.2d 675, 678-79 (st Cir. 1967) (no copyright protection when idea capable of only "a limited
number" of forms of expression).
196. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
197. The copyright of a book on book-keeping cannot secure the exclusive right to make,
sell, and use account-books prepared upon the plans set forth in such book ....
• .. In describing the art, the illustrations and diagrams employed happen to corre-
spond more closely than usual with the actual work performed by the operator who uses
the art... .. But the principle is the game .... The description of the art in a book,
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infringement of simple designs, 198 written game rules, 19 9 and pictorial represen-
tations on game boards.2° ° Many defendants in videogame cases have con-
tended, generally without success, that the games are similar because of the
limited number of ways to express the idea of frantic escape from a voracious
insectile creature.20 1 Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act now codifies the
defense.
2 02
The sparse software copyright case law suggests the potential for this de-
fense. In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,203 Franklin, the
admitted copyist, attacked the copyright of Apple's operating system on several
grounds, including the alleged identity of the idea and the expression embodied
in the system.2° 4 In Franklin's view, the pertinent idea apparently was "to en-
able a computer to run the vast body of Apple-compatible software.120 Apple's
though entitled to the benefit of copyright, lays no foundation for an exclusive claim to the
art itself.
Id. at 104-05.
198. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971) (bee-
shaped pin).
199. Durham Indus. Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 914-15 (2d Cir. 1980); Affiliated Hosp.
Prods., Inc. v. Merdel Game Mfg. Co., 513 F.2d 1183, 1188-89 (2d Cir. 1975).
200. Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222, 228-30 (D. Md. 1981).
201. Id.; see also Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d. 607,
616-17 (7th Cir. 1982) (discussion of "idea expression unity"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1983); cf.
Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 148 (D.N.J. 1982) (rejection of conten-
tion that "idea of. . .game actually includes the physical characteristics of the characters").
202. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982) provides:
In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work.
The House Report makes clear the purpose of § 102(h):
Nature of Copyright. Copyright does not preclude others from using the ideas or informa-
tion revealed by the author's work. It pertains to the literary, musical, graphic, or artistic
form in which the author expressed intellectual concepts. Section 102(b) [subsee. (b) of this
section] makes clear that copyright protection does not extend to any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the
form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.
Some concern has been expressed lest copyright in computer programs should extend
protection to the methodology or processes adopted by the programmer, rather than
merely to the "writing" expressing his ideas. Section 102(b) [subsec. (b) of this section] is
intended, among other things, to make clear that the expression adopted by the program.
mer is the copyrightable element in a computer program, and that the actual processes or
methods embodied in the program are not within the scope of the copyright law.
Section 102(b) [subsec. (b) of this section] in no way enlarges or contracts the scope of
copyright protection under the present law. Its purpose is to restate, in the context of the
new single Federal system of copyright, that the basic dichotomy between expression and
idea remains unchanged.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 56-57 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5659, 5670.
203. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), rev g 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982), cert. dismissed, 104 S.
Ct. 690 (1984).
204. Id. at 1252-53. Franklin also challenged the copyright status of object code embedded on a
ROM (read-only memory) chip, id. at 1249, and argued that an operating system was a "method of
operation," and thus not subject to copyright protection. Id. at 1250-51. The court of appeals re-
jected both of these arguments. Id.
205. Id. at 1253. "Apple-compatible software" includes both programs created by Apple and
those created by others that will run on Apple computers. Generally, two computer systems are
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operating programs were not protected by copyright, Franklin contended, be-
cause they represented one of only a "limited 'number of ways to arrange operat-
ing systems'" to achieve this end.
20 6
In responding to this argument, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit identified the pertinent inquiry as "whether the idea is capable of
various modes of expression. ... [I]f other programs can be written or created
which perform the same function as an Apple's operating system program, then
that program is an expression of the idea and hence copyrightable. '20 7 Because
of an inadequate factual record, the court remanded this issue for further
consideration.
20 8
The court of appeals' treatment of Franklin's idea-expression defense is
noteworthy in several respects, although it leaves unresolved at least one major
issue. First, the court rejected Franklin's argument that, for purposes of deter-
mining the separability of idea and expression, an operating system differs some-
how from other works of authorship. Franklin suggested that because the
operating system causes the machine to run and is purely utilitarian in purpose,
the system is nothing more than an idea in operation, more closely akin to a
patentable process than copyrightable expression. 20 9 The court interpreted the
statutory language strictly and characterized as "perhaps the most convincing
item leading us to reject Franklin's argument" the fact that section 101 of the
Copyright Act, which defines "computer program," "makes no distinction be-
tween application programs and operating programs."2 10 The court also relied
on the conclusion of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works. "'Programs should no more be considered machine parts
than videotapes should be considered parts of projectors or phonorecords parts
of sound reproduction equipment. . . .That the words of a program are used
ultimately in the implementation of a process should in no way affect their
copyrightability.' "211 It can be intuitively appealing, particularly to one unac-
quainted with programming, to view an operating system or other program as
too mechanistic to be protected as a work of authorship. The court's conclusion,
"compatible" when programs written for one will run on the other. For a discussion of IBM's
competitors' efforts to achieve compatibility with the IBM Personal Computer, see Davis, IBM PC
Software and Hardware Compatibility, COMPUTER LAW., July, 1984, at 11.
206. Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1253.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1250-51; cf. 35 U.S.C. §§ 100(b), 101 (1982) (patentability of processes).
210. Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1252 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)).
211. Id. at 1252 (quoting CONTU REPORT, supra note 12, at 21). The court treated the
CONTU REPORT as legislative history of the 1980 computer-related amendments to §§ 101 and 117
of the 1976 Copyright Act, "since Congress wrote into the law the [CONTU] majority's recommen-
dation almost verbatim." Id.; see Pub. L. No. 96-517, §10, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (amendments incor-
porated the definition of "computer program" into the Copyright Act). The district court drew a
different conclusion from the legislative history, focusing on a then inconclusive congressionial de-
bate over copyright protection for design patterns imprinted on computer chips. Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp 812, 819 n.9 (E.D. Pa. 1982); cf. Semiconductor Chip
Protection Act of Nov. 8, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, tit. III, § 303, 98 Stat. 3356 (adding new ch. 9 to
17 U.S.C.) (creating new forms of protection for semiconductor "mask work").
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however, that the plain language and legislative history of the statute require a
different approach is persuasive.
Second, the court refused to allow Franklin to define itself out of the in-
fringement. Franklin premised its claim of entitlement to the idea-expression
defense on the assertion that "there are limited number of ways to arrange oper-
ating systems to enable a computer to run the vast body of Apple-compatible
software."'212 Franklin seemed to argue that complete Apple-compatibility (that
is, the capability to use Apple programs on the Franklin machine) was Frank-
lin's "idea," which it could achieve only by copying Apple's object code.213 The
court of appeals, however, properly recognized that the relevant idea of each
operating system program is the fumction that it was intended to perform-"for
example, how to translate source code into object code."'214 The dispositive is-
sue then is whether there are alternative means of achieving these various func-
tional ends. The larger goal of compatibility was characterized as "a
commercial and competitive objective which does not enter into the somewhat
metaphysical issue of whether particular ideas and expressions have merged. ' 215
The idea-expression defense may be abused if a defendant persuades a court
to define the "idea" so narrowly that the defendant's copy of the plaintiff's work
is truly the only possible expression of that idea. As the court in a recent vide-
ogame case stated, "The 'idea' of any work could always be defined in such
detail that the description of the expression would add nothing to the 'idea,' thus
allowing a defendant to engage in all but verbatim copying.",216 "Such a ploy,"
the same court observed, "cannot be allowed."
2 17
Although the argument apparently was neither well developed nor well re-
ceived in Apple Computer, it might be more plausible in other circumstances.
Consider a plaintiff whose applications programs have wide user acceptance.
Hypothesize further a defendant attempting to develop a lower-cost program,
functionally similar to the plaintiff's program, that accepts user input in the
same way as the plaintiff's program and delivers identical output. Finally, as-
sume that the source code of the defendant's program closely resembles that of
the plaintiff's program, and that the defendant had access to the source and
212. Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1253.
213. Id. The district court described Franklin's argument somewhat more explicitly:
Franklin's goal was to create an operating system that would properly execute any
program that would run on an Apple computer, and to ensure that a user who had used
Apple programs on an Apple computer would notice no difference in using the Franklin.
Whether complete compatibility of operating systems can be achieved by independent crea-
tion will depend largely on the complexity of the system being emulated and its manner of
solving particular programming problems. Straightforward solutions often can be repli-
cated independently; more convoluted solutions may have to be copied to achieve complete
compatibility.
Id See Davidson, Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis, 1983 ARiz. ST. L. J.
611, 671 (final report of an American Bar Association committee on software protection).
214. Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1253.
215. Id.




object code of the plaintiff's program while writing his own.2 18
The defendant does not contest access, nor does he contest substantial simi-
larity. Conversely, he stresses it. He identifies his "idea" as the achievement of
one hundred percent user-level compatibility. The only question, he contends, is
whether there is more than one way to achieve such compatability, and he con-
tends that there is not. He argues that the plaintiff is trying improperly to fore-
close competition by extending a copyright monopoly into an area where idea
and expression have merged.
2 19
How should the court respond? It is likely to be aware, or at least informed
by the defendant, that achieving compatibility with the hardware and software
of other manufacturers is an industry in itself, and that it has had the salutary
effect of reducing consumer prices.220 Would the court be stifling a recognized
form of competition by rejecting the idea-expression defense? Or would accept-
ance of the defense dilute necessary copyright protection?22 1 Would the result-
ing precedent permit even the admitted plagiarist to escape through
rationalization and special pleading?
Although the court in Apple Computer rejected defendant's theory that its
"idea" was compatibility, it did so peremptorily and without detailed analysis.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas approached
the problem somewhat differently in Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University
Computing CO.
2 2 2
In Synercom the input formats used in a structural engineering analysis
program were at issue.223 The formats specified the manner in which the user's
data were to be entered into the computer. Synercom had provided the user
with forms to facilitate entering data in the appropriate formats, and had regis-
tered a copyright in the forms.224 Although the forms themselves resembled
218. This hypothetical is drawn from an argument made in S & H Computer Sys., Inc. v. SAS
Inst., Inc., 568 F. Supp 416 (M.D. Tenn. 1983). See supra note 158.
219. The recent opinion in Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984),
analyzed the antitrust implications of a copyright monopoly.
220. See Wall St. J., Feb. 3, 1984, at 25, cols. 1-2.
221. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp 125, 148 (D.NJ. 1982) ("The idea
of any work could always be defined in such detail that the description of the expression would add
nothing to the 'idea,' thus allowing a defendant to engage in all but verbatim copying.").
222. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978). Plaintiff asserted several state-law claims, including
unfair competition, a year later. The court declined to grant the relief sought, finding that federal
copyright law preempted it. Synercom Tech., Inc. v. University Computing Co., 474 F. Supp. 37, 38
(N.D. Tex. 1979); see infra notes 318-22 and accompanying text.
223. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1007-09. Synercom also argued that defendants had copied sub-
stantial portions of its printed manuals. Id. The court upheld the copyright in the manuals, found
copying, and ordered defendant to account for infringing materials already published and to desist
from further infringement. Id. at 1014-15.
224. Id. at 1007-09. The opinion often uses "form" and "format" interchangeably. In particu-
lar, the court discusses the copyright status of both the "formats" and the "forms" without distin-
guishing betwen the two. Id. at 1007, 1011. "Format" technically should refer, however, to the logic
and sequence the user follows in entering data, whereas "form" should refer to the printed cards that
guide the user to structure and enter the data correctly. An examination of the exhibits in the case
reveals that the forms were cards with lines and spaces arranged in a particular fashion. The only
words on the forms were column headings across the top. The dispute might have been framed more
clearly if the forms had been treated as the expression of the idea of input sequencing-the expres-
sion of the formats.
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blank business forms more than literary works, the court recognized that the
formats embodied in the forms were the product of substantial intellectual effort:
"Synercom conceived their logic and arranged their sequence. ' 225 Using this
logic and sequence, an engineer who formerly had needed three different pro-
grams to perform certain structural calculations now could perform the same
calculations in a more sophisticated manner with only a single program.22 6
Plaintiffs alleged that defendants had infringed by furnishing the users of
their competing system with instructions to enter data in a sequence identical to
that called for by the Synercom forms.227 Although defendants did not actually
copy and provide the Synercom forms, their instructions did include a "mirror
image" of the Synercom forms.228 Defendants' instructions ensured complete
compatibility with the Synercom program, since a user accustomed to the
Synercom entry formats could use defendants' program without any reinstruc-
tion or rehabituation.
229
The court initially rejected defendants' contention that the input forms
communicated no information and thus could not constitute the copyrighted
expression of an idea.230 In an interesting logical exercise, the court emphasized
that defendants' manual used a "mirror image" of the Synercom forms to in-
struct users how to format input data. Since the forms were instructive, the
court reasoned, they must convey information and thus constitute expression. 23 1
Having determined that the input forms constituted expression, the court
next addressed the "closely related" arguments that defendants had borrowed
only the ideas expressed in the forms, or to the extent that defendants had bor-
rowed expression, it was inseparable from the underlying ideas.23 2 The court
accepted both arguments.
The court analogized the ideas embodied in the forms to the figure-H pat-
tern of an automobile stick shift.2 33 Although an automobile manufacturer's
description of the stick shhft would be subject to copyright protection, a second
manufacturer would be free, at least for copyright purposes, to appropriate the
idea. The second manufacturer also could write its own description of the stick
shift, "however similar [it] may be to the first manufacturer's materials. '234
225. Id. at 1007.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1008, 1012.
228. Id. at 1009, 1012.
229. Id. at 1008-09, 1012.
230. Id. at 1011-12. The court contrasted the blank bookkeeping forms in Baker v. Selden, 101
U.S. 99 (1879), which conveyed no information and thus were not protected by copyright, with the
test answer sheets in Hartfield v. Peterson, 91 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1937), that had been held to convey
information. The court found the input forms more similar to the latter. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at
1011-12.
231. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1011-12. Later in the opinion, the court retreated somewhat
from this conclusion. Id. at 1014.
232. Id. at 1012-14. The lack of distinction between "forms" and "formats" is particularly con-
fusing in this part of the opinion. Defendants apparently argued that any expression embodied in the
forms was inseparable from the idea of entering data in particular formats.




Thus, substantial similarity of the two descriptions would be irrelevant for copy-
right purposes, as long as the second manufacturer had borrowed the unpro-
tected idea and then independently developed its own expression of the idea.
The court concluded that defendants had not borrowed any of Synercom's
protected expression. Rather, defendants had appropriated the ideas embodied
in the input forms (the logic and sequence) and expressed these ideas in their
instructions. That these instructions caused the user to enter data according to
the Synercom format and that the defendants' instructions contained a mirror
image of the Synercom form did not give rise to copyright liability because these
were incidental, if inevitable, results of borrowing the unprotected ideas.
235
In an important footnote,236 the court compared defendants' actions to
reading another programmer's manual, borrowing the manual's ideas to use in a
second program, and then writing a manual about the second program. The
court stated that such a process would not violate the copyright in the first man-
ual, regardless of any ultimate similarity between the manuals. Translating a
computer program into another language would be a violation, however, as
would be converting a "detailed description of a particular problem solution,
such as a flow chart or step-by-step set of prose instruction," into a computer
program. 237 In Synercom defendants merely had borrowed an idea, and then,
working independently, followed that idea to its logical conclusion; the result
might have been different, the court intimated, if defendants had copied from
Synercom's program.
238
Finally, the court held in the alternative that even if defendants had copied
expression, it was coextensive with the ideas being expressed and thus would not
be protected. If the only expression on the Synercom forms was the order and
sequence of inputs, that expression would not be subject to copyright protection
because it was "not separable [from the underlying ideas], for the form, arrange-
ment and combination is itself the intellectual conception involved."
'2 39
Given the facts that the court faced, the decision probably was correct. It is
difficult to separate the idea of entering data in a certain sequence from the
expression of that idea in a form that arranges the data appropriately. This
factual context differs from the Apple Computer situation, in which the idea was
the performance of particular functions by a computer and the expression was a
complex set of instructions written by a programmer to cause the machine to
carry out that function. The Synercom opinion, however, does have broader
implications for the idea-expression defense when a defendant has attempted to
achieve compatibility with a plaintiff's software.
First, Synercom states clearly that achieving compatibility is not itself a
copyright violation. Copyright liability does not result from the second program
235. Id. at 1012.
236. Id. at 1013 n.5.
237. Id.
238. "Hence [defendants'] preparation of a FORTRAN preprocessor program from the descrip-
tions contained in the manuals cannot constitute an infringing use provided this was done without
copying of the plaintiff's FORTRAN program, as it was." Id.
239. Id at 1014.
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duplicating the functions of the first or the users of the second program going
through the same input and output procedures as the users of the first. In fact,
according to Synercom, substantial similarity between the two user's manuals
and, perhaps, the two source codes may not even give rise to liability. The perti-
nent questions are whether the alleged infringer achieved similarity by borrow-
ing the ideas and the functionality of the first program and by independently
writing his own program and supporting documentation or whether he worked
from the plaintiff's code or a highly detailed description of the code.
24 °
Although Synercom states clearly that compatibility itself will not give rise
to liability, it is less clear whether a defendant who asserts that his goal is com-
patibility but admits copying original expression will be exonerated. The court
premised its holding on a finding that defendants had appropriated, at most,
unprotected ideas; it indicated that the result would have been different if de-
fendants had copied Synercom code or a detailed outline of the Synercom pro-
gram. Although this proposition appears straightforward, the significance of the
term "idea" is uncertain. The borrowed idea in Synercom may have been the
concept of compatibility. Defendants' apparent goals-to duplicate the func-
tions of the Synercom program and to permit users to enter and receive data in
the same manner as with the Synercom program-support this interpretation. 24 1
If this interpretation is correct, the opinion may suggest that infringement oc-
curs if a defendant borrows detailed programming expressions, even if pursuing
compatibility.
The court, however, seems not to have viewed the borrowed idea as having
such broad implications. Rather, it seemed to interpret the idea in functional
terms, as did the court in Apple Computer.242 The Synercom court's mechanical
analogy and its use of language such as "sequencing and ordering of data"
243
suggest that the court read nothing more into the "idea" than the arrangement
of data, and that it did not make the logical jump from the specifics of data
arrangement to the general concept of compatibility. 244 Thus, a more prudent
interpretation of the case is that it leaves open whether pursuing compatibility is
a complete defense to unambiguous acts of plagiarism.
The most significant point in Synercom may be that the court viewed the
functional similarity between the two programs as not dispositive of the copy-
right issue, if not irrelevant to it. The court focused, rather, on defendants' con-
duct, in particular whether they had used any elements of Synercom's program
240. In footnote 5 the court commented that the preparation of a computer program in any
language from a description of the problem to be solved (even if that description was written "in
sufficient detail and with sufficient precision to enable it to be converted into an unambiguous set of
computer instructions") would be an independent creative act and would not give rise to copyright
liability for similarities at the code level. Id. at 1013 n.5. The court drew a less-than-lucid distinc-
tion between this process and preparing a program from a description that included "a flow chart or
step-by-step set of prose instructions, written in human language." Id. The latter program "would
probably be a violation" of the original program's copyright. Id.
241. Id. at 1008.
242. Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1253.
243. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1013.
244. In other words, the court did not consider the broader question of whether the "idea" of
compatibility excuses any copying of expression necessary to perform that idea.
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in creating their own.245 As noted above, given the nature of programming,
courts probably should focus on conduct rather than attempt to apply the sub-
stantial similarity test.246 Section V suggests that a similar focus on conduct
may help resolve the compatibility dilemma.
D. Subsequent Alterations
If a particular version of the defendant's program is found to be substan-
tially similar to the plaintiff's program, or even if the defendant admits copying
some or all of a plaintiff's program, the defendant may offer to alter his work
prior to distributing it, or introduce evidence that he already has done so. 24 7
The defendant will argue that since the version of his work that will be marketed
is not substantially similar to the plaintiff's work, the defendant should not be
held liable for infringement, regardless of similarity in earlier versions or other
contrary evidence.
This argument has had a mixed reception in the literary and artistic cases.
Professor Nimmer's treatise supports the argument, stating that "a defendant
may legitimately avoid infringement by intentionally making sufficient changes
in a work which would otherwise be regarded as substantially similar to that of
the plantiff's." 248 The court in one recent case relied on Nimmer in finding that
defendant's doll did not infringe plaintiff's doll, partly because of changes made
by defendant to render the two dolls less similar.249 In another recent case the
author of a novel sought to enjoin the broadcast of a television movie allegedly
based on the novel.250 The court rejected plaintiff's comparison of the novel to
defendant's screenplay, holding that the movie as broadcast was the only rele-
vant evidence of infringement.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, on the other
hand, rejected this argument in a case involving an alleged copy of an ornamen-
tal screen.25 1 In response to defendant's claim that it had cured any infringe-
ment by changing the screen, the court pointed out that "the starting point for
[defendant's] 'redesign' was the plaintiff's work."' 252 The court determined that,
given this essential fact, subsequent changes would not excuse the initial plagia-
rism; they merely were "colorable alterations made to disguise the piracy.
'253
245. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 153-58 and accompanying text.
247. In S & H Computer Sys. v. SAS Inst., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 416 (M.D. Tenn. 1983), defendant
offered evidence that recent versions of the allegedly infringing program were less similar. See supra
note 158.
248. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 59, § 13.03 [B], at 13-43.
249. Eden Toys, Inc. v. Marshall Field & Co., 675 F.2d 498, 501 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Warner
Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 654 F.2d 204, 210 (11th Cir. 1981) (citing M. NIMMER,
supra note 59, for proposition that defendant may avoid liability by making changes sufficient to
avoid finding of substantial similarity).
250. Fuld v. National Broadcasting Co., 390 F. Supp. 877, 882 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
251. Tennessee Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 279 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 928 (1970).
252. Id. at 284.
253. Id.
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In another case,254 plaintiff, named Davis, had written a dramatization of an
Edith Wharton novel, and defendants had produced and sponsored a television
play based on the same novel. Having found substantial similarity between
plaintiff's novel and defendants' dramatizations of the novel, the court examined
defendants' efforts to "unDavis" the television script prior to its broadcast. The
court considered these efforts "too little, too late and too transparent," but, per-
haps significantly, never stated that the attempt to "unDavis" the script was
unavailing as a matter of law.
255
There is no apparent way to reconcile these conflicting authorities. The
Nimmer view seems to follow logically from a somewhat mechanical reading of
the 1909 Act 256 and the substantial similarity case law.257 If the plaintiff is
trying to enjoin the distribution of an infringing work, then the test should be
(absent evidence of direct copying) whether the work sought to be enjoined is
substantially similar to the plaintiff's work. The defendant should not be liable
for his prior substantially similar work since the plaintiff does not seek to enjoin
that prior work.
This argument has two shortcomings, one equitable and one statutory.
First, there is something inherently inequitable about permitting a defendant to
appropriate a plaintiff's creative effort, presumably saving himself a great deal of
time and money, and then to escape liability by making cosmetic changes prior
to distribution of the otherwise infringing work. 258 An unspoken appreciation
of these equities may underlie those decisions that view subsequent alterations as
"too little, too late and too transparent.
'25 9
Second, the argument favoring the defense seems to ignore that, under the
present Act, one of the copyright holder's exclusive rights is to prepare deriva-
tive works.260 A derivative work "is a work based upon one or more preexisting
254. Davis v. E.I. DuPont deNemours & Co., 240 F. Supp. 612, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
255. Id. at 620-21.
256. Under § l(a) of the 1909 Copyright Act, the exclusive rights of the copyright holder in-
cluded the rights "[t]o print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work." Act of March
4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075. Compare this language with that of § 106(l)-(3) of the present Act,
17 U.S.C. §106 (1)-(3) Q982), which grants exclusive rights: "(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work
in copies or phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; [and]
(3) to distribute copies." A semantic argument can be made that the new Act, by replacing such
terms as "print" and "vend" with broader prohibitions against copying and preparing derivative
works, focuses more on the conduct of the alleged infringer and less on the commerical exploitation
of the allegedly infringing work. In the reported cases, the Nimmer view seems not to have been
challenged on this basis.
257. See supra notes 141-57 and accompanying text.
258. The defendent will argue, of course, that the superficial dissimilarities are evidence that he
originally appropriated only the plaintiff's ideas.
259. Davis v. E.I. DuPont deNemours & Co., 240 F. Supp. 612, 620-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
260. 17 U.S.C. § 102(2) (1982). This right has no counterpart in the 1909 Act. The cases had
used the term "derivative work," but it referred to a second work that was sufficiently different from
an earlier one to receive independent copyright status as a "derivative work." See, eg., Original
Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 830 (11th Cir. 1982) (copyright status
of successive generations of dolls); Grove Press, Inc. v. Greenleaf Publishing Co., 247 F. Supp. 518
(E.D.N.Y. 1965) (copyright status of original French work and subsequent translations). Interest-
ingly, some of the cases taking the Nimmer view were decided after the January 1, 1978 effective date
of the 1976 Act. See supra note 249.
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works," including recastings, transformations, or adaptations of the original.2 6 1
Although no cases are squarely on point, the definition should include a work
copied from an existing work and then altered to disguise the similarities.
2 62
The fundamental flaw in the subsequent alteration defense, however, is that
it treats substantial similarity as an end rather than a means. Substantial similar-
ity, after all, is only circumstantial evidence of copying, to be used when no
direct evidence is available.2 63 There is no a priori basis for treating it as the
sole determinant of liability when other forms of evidence are available. This
approach is precisely what those courts that have permitted exculpation by sub-
sequent alteration have done. To pursue the "unDavising" example,264 is not
defendants' attempt to "unDavis" their original script circumstantial evidence
that they copied plaintiff's play? Similarly, is it not relevant that defendants
considered an earlier version of their script even more similar to Davis' play
than the version actually broadcast?
265
To ignore prior versions of a work assumes that what the Copyright Act
prohibits is the distribution of a substantially similar work. Although the lan-
guage of the former Copyright Act may support such an interpretation, the pres-
ent Act, particularly in its expansive definition of derivative work, focuses on the
defendant's behavior. Under this view, the relevant question is whether it can be
inferred from all the available evidence that the defendant copied the plaintiff's
work or prepared a derivative work based on it.
The equitable considerations supporting this view are particularly compel-
ling in a software copyright case. Once even a rudimentary version of the alleg-
edly infringing program has been entered into a computer system that has text
editing capabilities, a plagiarist can make massive changes in the. appearance of
the source code in a matter of seconds.2 66 Consider again the example of a
program designed to perform statistical calculations. Assume that a plagiarist
has copied this program verbatim. Using the text editing capabilities of most
general purpose computer systems, the plagiarist can make nonfunctional
changes in procedure and variable names, the order in which calculations are
performed, the order in which variables appear within particular equations, and
the manner in which particular categories of data are represented in the pro-
gram. None of these changes is particularly significant from either a statistical
or programming standpoint; all can be accomplished with minimal time and
261. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
262. This logic is particularly compelling when at some stage in the derivation process the de-
fendant "copied" the plaintiff's work in the traditional sense. Cf. Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Man-
agement Assistance Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 450 (D. Idaho 1983) (citing exclusive right to make
copies, court issues preliminary injunction against Hubco product that alters operation of MAI oper-
ating system, since at one stage Hubco product creates copy of MAI object code).
263. See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
264. Davis v. E.I. DuPont deNemours & Co., 240 F. Supp. 612, 620-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
265. Cf. Meredith Corp v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 385, 388 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) ("alterations [in textbook] to conceal obvious plagiarism" held to be evidence of copyright
infringement).
266. One way to edit text is to use a word processing program to correct, reorder, and reformat.
Specially designed programs can make other, more complex changes in the code, such as reordering
a sdries of calculations. See Davidson, supra note 7, at 376-78.
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creative effort by the plagiarist. Together, however, they may result in a source
code that, at least from the perspective of the lay observer, has little similarity to
the original work.
Many programmers believe that the most difficult part of programming is
developing an initial, rough version of the code. This "working draft" version
need not accomplish the desired task accurately or efficiently, as long as it em-
bodies a method for accomplishing the task that a computer can execute. This
version then can serve as a basis for elaboration, refinement, and, in some cases,
wholesale substitution. Although this initial version may bear little superficial
resemblance to the final one, many programmers find that once they have devel-
oped an initial version the remainder of the programming process moves far
more quickly.
267
The initial draft may be of much greater practical significance when writing
a computer program than when writing a book. The initial draft of a book gets
the ideas on paper. The author can posit and reject alternative ways of expres-
sing those ideas using little time or money. Since the computer program is func-
tional, however, the inital version not only gets the ideas on paper but is a true
working model. To create that working model, the original programmer may
have spent much time and money developing and testing alternatives.2 68 The
computer plagiarist thus derives a tangible and substantial benefit from avoiding
those lines of inquiry which yield results that simply do not work.
A defendant who can rely on the subsequent alteration defense can use an-
other's copyrighted program as an initial version of a second program. Such a
defendant need only refine the first program. Regardless of how extensive the
process of refinement, 269 if the first program "works" to some extent, the second
programmer has been spared many blind alleys. In some cases, the second
programmer only may have to make changes to avoid palpable similarities.
The defendant may argue that borrowing and changing is common in the
literary world and is merely the borrowing of unprotected ideas. 270 The defense
only will apply, however, if the changes are extensive enough to preclude a find-
ing of substantial similarity of the final versions. With a literary work, such
changes likely will require so much creative effort that little will remain of the
first work but the ideas it embodied. 271 With a computer program, by contrast,
it sometimes requires limited creative effort to make alterations sufficient to
avoid readily apparent similarity. In that case, it is more accurate to find that
the defendant initially copied both idea and expression, and then made changes
267. See generally 1 D. BENDER, supra note 2, § 2.06 [3][e] (discussion of "debugging"). There
was expert testimony to this effect in S & H Computer Sys., Inc. v. SAS Institute, Inc., 568 F. Supp
416 (M.D. Tenn. 1983). See supra note 158.
268. See 1 D. BENDER, supra note 2, §2.06 [3][e].
269. The refinement process still may be difficult, but significantly less difficult than starting
from the beginning without a working model. See id.
270. But cf. Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 385, 387 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (defense rejected in literary context).
271. Eg., Davis v. United Artists, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 722, 724 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (Defendants'
movie Coming Home did not infringe copyright in plaintiff's novel, regardless of similarites between
novel and earlier screen plays.).
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to mask the initial borrowing of expression. Since the second programmer may
have made those changes more or less mechanically, unlike his literary counter-
part, he did not necessarily substitute his own expression for that in the original.
Although there is little or no relevant case law,272 the new Act's definition
of derivative work273 again is helpful. If plagiarism followed by disingenuous
alteration is not the creation of an unauthorized derivative work, what is? The
focus once again is on the defendant's conduct; the relevant inquiry is whether
he based his program on or adapted it from a preexisting program. If the plain-
tiff shows that the defendant initially appropriated both ideas and expression,
derived substantial benefit from doing so, and then made "colorable alterations
. ..to disguise the piracy" 274 without contributing substantial original expres-
sion, it will be fully consistent with traditional copyright principles to find the
defendant liable because of his behavior.
E. The Section 117 Defense
The current version of section 117 of the Copyright Act is another potential
problem in software infringement litigation.275 This section was added in 1980
to clarify the protection of computer programs.2 76 It provides that the "owner"
of a copy of a copyrighted program does not infringe by making "another copy
or adaptation" as long as it is an essential step in using the program on a
machine or is made for archival purposes only and destroyed when rightful pos-
session of the original program ends.
Current section 117 first was subjected to close scrutiny in Atari, Inc. v.
272. See infra notes 337-51 and accompaning text.
273. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(2) (1982); see supra notes 260-62 and accompanying text.
274. Tennessee Fabricating Co. v Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 279, 284 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 928 (1970).
275. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982) provides:
Limitations on exclusive rights: Computer programs
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the owner of a
copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy or adapta-
tion of that computer program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of
the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other man-
ner, or
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all archival
copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the computer program
should cease to be rightful.
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this section may be leased,
sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy from which such copies were prepared,
only as part of the lease, sale, or other transfer of all rights in the program. Adaptations so
prepared may be transferred only with the authorization of the copyright owner.
276. Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10(b), 94 Stat. 3028 (1980). The present § 117 was added as part of a
lengthy bill amending many provisions of the Patent Act. It is clear from the House Report and
Congressional Record, however, that Congress saw the 1980 copyright amendments as a codification
of the CONTU REPORT recommendations. See H.R. REP. No. 1307, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 19, re-
printed in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6460, 6482; 18 CONG. REc. H 10,767 (daily ed.
Nov. 17, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmaier); 18 CONG. REc. S14,761 (daily ed. Nov 20, 1980)
(remarks of Sen. Bayh). CONTU recommended, however, that § 117 rights be extended to "rightful
possessors," yet Congress' version applies only to an "owner of a copy of a program." See supra note
50; CONTU REPORT, supra note 12, at 30.
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JS&A1 Group, InC.2 7 7 Defendant JS&A sold a device that duplicated certain
Atari and Atari-compatible videogames. In response to a claim of contributory
infringement, 278 JS&A claimed that its product had a substantial noninfringing
use-duplication of Atari games for archival purposes-as section 117 per-
mits. 2 7 9 The court held section 117 inapplicable. It examined the CONTU Re-
port and determined that the narrow purpose of the archival copy exception was
to protect a user against "'destruction or damage by mechanical or electrical
failure.' ",280 The court reasoned that since the primary threat to videogame
cartridges was physical rather than mechanical or electrical, defendant could not
invoke the archival copy exception.28 1 Thus, the court did not address whether
the section ever could exculpate a defendant whose purpose was to infringe or
promote infringement.
Consider the buyer of a single copy of a copyrighted program, who is thus
the "owner" of that copy. Because he plans to develop a competing program, he
makes a second copy of the copyrighted program to facilitate studying it. The
copyright proprietor files suit, claims that the making of the second copy vio-
lated his copyright, and seeks ultimately to enjoin further work on the compet-
ing product. The user responds that, regardless of his intent, the second copy
serves an archival purpose and thus is permissible under section 117.
The initial response must be that the presence of any nonarchival purpose,
277. [1984] COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 25,613 (N.D. Il. Dec. 6, 1983). The court in Hubco
Data Prods. Corp. v. Management Assistance Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 450, 456 (D. Idaho Sept.
18, 1983), similarly rejected a § 117 defense. The court granted a preliminary injunction against a
computer program that enhanced the functioning of a copyrighted operating system, because the
infringing product, during execution, created an unauthorized copy of the operating system. The
court rejected the § 117 defense on the threshold basis that the alleged infringer was not an "owner"
of the operating system. Id.
More recently, in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal,
1984), plaintiff Apple Computer previously had obtained a preliminary injunction prohibiting the
defendant Formula from copying any of Apple's copyrighted programs and from selling computer
components that contained copies of such programs. On Apple's motion for contempt, the court
found that Formula was continuing to sell computers and computer kits that contained copyrighted
Apple programs encoded on ROM chips. Formula contended that it had lawfully purchased copies
of the Apple programs on "Wong diskettes," which had been produced with Apple's authorization.
Id. at 620. Formula concluded that since it was "'the owner of a copy'" of the Apple programs, it
could make and distribute the ROM copies as "'new copies.. . created as an essential step in the
utilization of a computer program in conjunction with' a machine of its own." Id. (quoting 17
U.S.C. § 117 (1982)). The Court reviewed the CONTU REPORT and some of the sources considered
by CONTU, characterized Formula's invocation of § 117 as a "pretext," and held Formula in con-
tempt. Id. at 622-23.
Finally, in MicroSparc, Inc. v. Amtype Corp., 592 F. Supp. 33 (D. Mass. 1984), the court found
infringement when a "typing service" copied programs from a computer magazine onto disks, dupli-
cated the disks, and sold them to readers of the magazine. Id. at 34. The court rejected the argu-
ment that § 117 authorized such conduct. The court cited and followed the analysis ofJS&A,. Id. at
35.
278. [1984] COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 25.613, at 18,695. The theory of the contributory
infringement claim was that JS&A contributed to the making of unlawful copies by the users of its
product. The substantial noninfringing-use defense has its roots in patent law, but a recent Supreme
Court decision made clear that the doctrine is relevant in copyright as well. See Sony Corp. of Am.
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774, 789-90 (1984).
279. [1984] COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 25,613, at 18,695.
280. Id. at 18,696 (quoting CONTU REPORT, supra note 12, at 31).
281. [1984] COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 25,613, at 18,696.
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however secondary, will foreclose the section 117 defense. Section 117 requires
that the copy be "created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer
program" and that it be "used in no other manner," or that the copy be created
"for archival purposes only." Two further questions, however, arise from this
response.
First, how should "purpose" be defined? Does it mean subjective purpose,
so that an unconsummated plan (as in the hypothetical) forecloses the defense,
or objective purpose referring only to actual nonarchival or nonessential use?
Although there are no cases no point, the CONTU report 282 clearly implies that
the sole purpose of section 117 is to provide to "[o]ne who rightfully possesses a
copy of program. . a legal right to copy it to that extent which will permit its
use by that possessor."1283 The report does not suggest any intent to increase the
burden borne by a copyright plaintiff by providing a technical defense to one
who intends to make other than lawful use of a program that he rightfully pos-
sesses. Accordingly, courts should construe the section as not providing a de-
fense for one who has made actual use of a copy other than the permitted
operational and archival uses or has made a copy that he plans to use impermis-
sibly. Section 117 should not exonerate a defendant who made a copy as part of
an impermissible, thwarted scheme merely because he could have put the sus-
pect copy to an archival use.
Second, who should bear the burden of proof on the propriety of the de-
fendant's activities? The court in JS&A treated section 117 as an exception to
the general principle that the making of unauthorized copies constitutes in-
fringement.2 8 4 Although the court did not state so explicitly, it seemed to view
section 117 as an affirmative defense to a prima facie case of infringement. The
court concluded that the alleged infringer bears the "burden of bringing itself
within the section 117 exception."285 Once the plaintiff has established a prima
facie case that an unauthorized copy has been made, the burden shifts to the
defendant to prove either that the copy was used exclusively for, and an essential
step in, the utilization of the program, or that the copy was for archival purposes
only. In the above hypothetical, the plaintiff would demonstrate that the de-
fendant made an unauthorized copy,2 86 and the defendant then would have to
persuade the court that he had only one purpose, permissible under section 117,
and that his conduct was consistent with that permissible purpose.
287
The legislative history and the CONTU report do not discuss the allocation
of burden. Nevertheless, it seems fair to infer from both the language of the
section and the tone of the legislative history that Congress intended not to add
282. JS&A is consistent with other cases in treating the CONTU Report as the legislative history
of the 1980 computer-related amendments. Id.; see supra note 211.
283. CONTU REPORT, supra note 12, at 13.
284. [1984] COPYRIGHT L. DEC. 25,613, at 18,696.
285. Id.
286. In S & H Computer Sys., Inc. v. SAS Inst. Inc., 568 F. Supp. 416,422 (M.D. Tenn. 1983),
several briefs mentioned the § 117 defense. The defense clearly was inapplicable, however, since the
alleged infringer was a licensee rather than an owner.
287. In other words, he would have to demonstrate both subjective and objective compliance
with § 117.
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to the burden borne by copyright holders, but simply to identify limited circum-
stances in which users might meet their technical needs without violating section
106's blanket prohibition on unauthorized copying.288 JS&A 's allocation of the
burden is consistent with this interpretation of the purpose of section 117.
F User-level Languages
One of the most difficult issues that can arise in computer-related intellec-
tual property disputes is how to treat a system through which the user interacts
with the program, sometimes termed a user language.289 Such a language likely.
will include a lexicon of words and symbols, some of which may be novel and
others of which may come from mathematics, logic, English, or an existing com-
puter language. The user language also will include syntactical rules for com-
bining these lexical elements, some of which again may be original and others of
which may be drawn from the rules of existing computer languages. The com-
ponents of the language system that arguably may be protected are the screen
displays that control input, the manuals sections that list the lexical elements
and the syntactic rules, and the language itself.
The input displays seem analogous to the displays that videogame programs
produce, which have been held subject to copyright protection as audio-visual
displays.290 Videogame programs produce both "attract mode" displays, which
display typical game sequences when no one is playing, and "play mode" dis-
plays, in which the user interacts with the computer program to produce action
sequences.291 It has been held that the user's contribution, through his moves
and choices, to the final audio-visual product of the play mode sequences does
not affect copyright protection.
292
The input screens generated by an applications programs are logically indis-
tinguishable from the displays generated by a videogame, particularly in the play
mode. Both types of displays contain expression that the program generates and
invite participation in a particular manner by the user, all of which may deter-
mine the contents of further displays.
Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co.,293 however, may
suggest a different analysis and conclusion. One of Synercom's alternative hold-
ings was that input formats were not subject to copyright protection, in part
because they merged idea and expression. 294 If the input screens from a particu-
lar program can be analogized -to the input formats in Synercom, the screens
288. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1982); see supra notes 282-83 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 22, 30-32 and accompanying text.
290. E.g., Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artie Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1012 (7th Cir. 1983); Atari, Inc.
v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 617 (7th Cir. 1982), cerl. denied,
459 U.S. 880 (1983); Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 856 (2d Cir. 1982).
291. Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 854-55 (2d Cir. 1982).
292. Id. at 855-56; see also Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artie Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1011 (7th Cir.
1983) (player's contribution to production of images on videogame screen does not render the images
his work for copyright purposes).
293. 462 F. Supp 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
294. Id. at 1012-14.
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should not be protected by copyright, regardless of any analogies to audio-visual
displays, as long as there has been no copying of the program that generates the
screens.2 95 Under Synercom the idea underlying the input screens is the ar-
rangement of data in a particular format; the screen merely expresses one of a
limited number of means of achieving that format.
The way to reconcile these conflicting views may be to focus on the input
forms that Synercom used. These forms were nothing more than cards with
blank spaces arranged in a particular sequence under column headings; the man-
ual instructed the user how to fill in the spaces.296 Although the court found
these forms to be expression (albeit indistinguishable from the underlying idea),
they bore little or no resemblance to the literary or artistic works usually en-
countered in copyright cases. The court in Synercom perhaps was swayed by the
lack of literary or symbolic content in the forms, notwithstanding its protesta-
tions about expression. Under this view, Synercom should be limited to its facts
and not applied to screens that not only arrange data but contain recognizable
literary output.
2 9 7
The description and compilation of the user lanaguage in manuals clearly
seems protected. Copyright should protect the manual as a book, including
those portions listing the elements of the language or describing its use.
298
Other compilations, such as the quick reference cards often used with software
295. See id. at 1013 n.5. A program used in preparing medical insurance claims would generate
a series of screens calling for a variety of information about the claimant. The information entered in
response to inquiries on one screen would determine the inquiries on subsequent screens.
296. Id. at 1007-08, 1011; see supra notes 223-29 and accompanying text.
297. Cf. Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F. Supp. 517, 525-26
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (test answer sheets subject to copyright protection). Even if, under this argument,
copyright protects the input screens, it would not protect the logic and sequence of the input process,
to which Synercom's stick shift analogy would apply. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1013.
298. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1982) provides as follows:
Subject matter of copyright: Compilations and derivative works
(a) The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes compilations
and derivative works, but protection for a work employing preexisting material in which
copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such material has been
used unlawfully.
(b) The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the material
contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material
employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material.
The copyright in such work is independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the scope,
duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the preexisting
material.
Copyright protection thus subsists in the portions of the compilation that the author contributed.
The author may contribute by ordering items not themselves subject to copyright protection. E.g.,
Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 862-63 (2d Cir. 1984) (infringement of copyright in
baseball card catalogue); Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 672 F.2d 1095, 1102 (2d
Cir.) (copyright in compilation of Charlie Chaplin film clips), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982);
Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet Mtg. Sys. Inc., 591 F. Supp. 726, 731 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (copyright in
mileage numbers on highway maps). The extent of copyright protection in a compilation of histori-
cal facts is controversial, and the Supreme Court recently has granted certiorari in a case involving
President Ford's memoirs. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.
1983), cert. granted, 52 U.S.L.W. 3860 (May 29, 1984) (No. 83-1632). See generally Denicola, Copy-
right in Collections of Fact." A Theory for Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L.
REv. 576 (1981) (comprehensive review of compliation case law); Shipley & Hay, Protecting Re-
search: Copyright, Common-Law Alternatives, and Federal Pereemption, 63 N.C.L. Rav. 125 (1984)
(review of copyright and state-law protection for research in nonfiction works).
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manuals, should enjoy similar protection.2 99
Here too, however, Synercom intrudes with a cautionary note. Even if
copyright protection subsists as described above, Synercom notes that infringe-
ment occurs only when a work subject to copyright protection, such as a screen
or manual, has itself been copied. Another programmer who uses the same lan-
guage in his program will not incur copyright liability by writing a manual for
the use of his program, regardless of how similar his manual is to the one written
by the original programmer.
30°
This conclusion assumes, of course, that the language itself does not enjoy
copyright protection. There are at least two ways to approach this issue. First,
a series of early cases held that copyright protects compilations of code words.
In Hartfield v. Peterson30 1 plaintiff's work was a compilation of approximately
75,000 code words and phrases. Defendant attacked the work's copyright sta-
tus, arguing that many, if not most, of plaintiff's words and phrases appeared in
other codes that were in the public domain, which plaintiff virtually had admit-
ted.30 2 Judge Learned Hand, writing for the court, rejected this argument, find-
ing that plaintiff's act of compilation was itself original. 30 3 Significantly, the
court held that the copyright extended both to the compilation and to the indi-
vidual coinages themselves to the extent that they were original: "Both the
phrases, so far as they were his, and the arrangement were proper subjects of
copyright. ' '304 Moreover, the court'noted that the widespread use in business of
some of the individual words and phrases did not affect its holding.
30 5
Conversely, it has been held that copyright does not protect a system of
taking shorthand. 30 6 Nonetheless, Hartfield apparently represents the majority
view; it is consistent with earlier cases involving codes and symbolic representa-
tions, 30 7 it was followed as recently as 1971,308 and it was cited in Synercom.
309
299. Such cards typically list the most commonly used lexical elements. E.g., SAS 79.5 Refer-
ence Card (SAS Inst. 1981).
300. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1013-14 (stick shift hypothetical).
301. 91 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1937).
302. Id. at 999.
303. Id.
304. Id. It is difficult to determine precisely what the court meant by this statement, particularly
because the preceding sentence points out: "Mhe right protected by Hartfield's copyright was not
to the use of the words found in the phrases, but to the many arrangements.. . which the author
selected to express his idea." Id. (citations omitted). See infra notes 313-14 and accompanying text.
305. Hartfield, 91 F.2d at 999.
306. Brief English Systems, Inc. v. Owen, 48 F.2d 555 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 283 U.S. 853
(1931).
307. The court had reached a similar conclusion in an earlier case involving another book of
coined code words. Reiss v. National Quotation Bureau, 276 F.2d 717 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1921) (L.
Hand, J.). The same court also had suggested in dictum in another case that a copyright might
subsist in a geometric design "'illustrating thought processes and formulating scientific information
in regard to same.'" Korzybski v. Underwood & Underwood, Inc., 36 F.2d 727, 728 (2d Cir. 1929)
(A. Hand, J.). The court found in the latter case, however, that a photograph of the work did not
infringe because plaintiff already had included drawings of the work in a patent application, thus
placing the work in the public domain. Id. at 729.
308. Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F. Supp. 517, 524 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
309. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1011.
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If Hartfield remains sound law, the analogies between a code and a user
language initially are persuasive. Both are collections of words and symbols,
borrowed and original, in which the symbolic system has meaning only if a set of
conventions is followed. If indeed a user language is analogous to a code, Judge
Hand's conclusion that copyright protected Hartfield's words and phrases would
be significant;3 10 copyright then would protect the elements of the user language
original to the programmer, regardless of past use by others.
Application of the codebook rationale to a user-level language, however,
results in a major logical gap. Section 106 of the Copyright Act reserves several
rights to the copyright holder, including the rights to make copies and to pre-
pare derivative works.311 The offense in each instance is the unauthorized use of
the copyrighted work. If a plaintiff premises an infringement action on unauthor-
ized use of a user-level language in a competing work, how will he identify the
infringed work?
If the defendant has copied a compilation or description of the language,
the analysis is relatively straightforward (subject, of course, to the Synercom
caveats discussed above). Since a copyright may subsist in a compilation, unau-
thorized copying of the compilation of a language in a manual or on a reference
card should violate that copyright. Similarly, copying a description in a manual
is indistinguishable from copying any other book. The analysis is more difficult,
however, if the plaintiff alleges that the defendant developed a competing pro-
gram that accepts a language identical to the plaintiff's and wrote documenta-
tion describing that language. Following Hartfield, the plaintiff will argue that
the copyright subsists in the elements of the language themselves, and that the
defendant violated the copyright by including these elements in his program and
documentation. The defendant will respond that the plaintiff cannot point to a
"work" that has been misappropriated, but rather is seeking to protect either an
idea or individual words, neither of which copyright protects.
312
The defendant's argument is more persuasive. Abstractions do not enjoy
copyright protection; an infringer must infringe a protected work. If the defend-
ant merely writes a program that accepts the elements and syntactical rules of
the plaintiff's language, the defendant has not infringed a protected work.
Judge Hand, however, remarked in Hartfield that "the phrases. . . were
proper subjects of copyright.13 13 Although any statement by Learned Hand in a
copyright decision is not to be dismissed lightly, it only can be inferred that the
remark is aberrant dictum. The statement was unnecessary to the decision since
defendant had copied portions of the compilation.3 14 Moreover, it is plainly
310. Hartfield, 91 F.2d at 999.
311. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1), (2) (1982).
312. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982) (copyright protection does not extend to ideas); 37 C.F.R.
§ 202.1(a) (1984) (no registration of "[w]ords and short phrases"); 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 59,
§ 2.16.
313. Hartfield, 91 F.2d at 999.
314. Id. The trial court found "a large number of substantially identical phrases that are in the
two codes and certain sequences of phrases."
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inconsistent with that most venerable of copyright maxims: copyright protects
only works of expression, not ideas and abstractions.
Second, Synercom also supports the theory that copyright cannot protect a
user-level language. The court concluded that copyright did not bar one
programmer from using input formats that another had developed, or indepen-
dently producing descriptions of those formats. 31 5 In one important sense, a
user-level language is a set of "input formats." The language elements and syn-
tax specify acceptable means for entering data, selecting options, and generating
output-purposes similar to those served by the input formats in Synercom.
Synercom, therefore, suggests that any expression embodied in a user-level lan-
guage is indistinguishable from the underlying ideas of arranging and entering
data and controlling the program's operation.
There are differences, however, between the largely blank forms used by
Synercom3 16 and a complex user-level language. As suggested earlier, the differ-
ences between the forms and traditionally protected literary expression may
have influenced the Synercom court.3 17 A user language may be the culmination
of a long process of designing and manipulating elements of expression. The
language must be intelligible to the user, must be comprehensive and internally
consistent, and must direct the operation of the program.
Although this distinction may avoid the precedential effect of Synercom, it
does not solve the fundamental problem-the absence of an identifiable pro-
tected work. This absence makes it unlikely that copyright protection will be
extended to the elements and syntax of user-level languages, notwithstanding
Judge Hand's dictum. Copyright may protect discrete manifestations of the lan-
guage, including screen displays, compilations, and description. Passing off and
misappropriation claims asserted under federal trademark law318 and the statu-
tory3 19 and common law of unfair competition, however, may be the only means
of protecting the language itself.320 A plaintiff asserting such claims generally
315. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1013-14 & n.5.
316. See supra notes 223-29 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 296-97 and accompanying text.
318. See Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982). Section 43(a) prohibits, "words or
other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent" the origin of goods or services. In certain
circumstances, misappropriation of another's user language arguably could confuse customers about
the origin of a software product.
319. See, eg., TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-104(b)(1)-(4) (1984). These provisions of the Tennes-
see Consumer Protection Act are similar to the Lanham Act in prohibiting practices that tend to
create confusion about a product's source. Because one of the stated purposes of the Consumer
Protection Act is to promote "good faith dealings between buyers and sellers at all levels of com-
merce," id. § 47-18-102(4), it presumably is available to persons other than retail consumers. See id.
§ 47-18-109(a) (private right of action available to "any person who suffers an ascertainable loss...
as a result of the use of or by another person of an unfair or deceptive act or practice declared to be
unlawful by this part").
Other states have more general prohibitions against unfair or deceptive acts or practices. See,
eg., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 2 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1984).
Some of these states have created a private right of action for any person injured by a prohibited
practice, see, eg., N.C. GEN STAT § 75-16 (1984), whereas others have provided for an express
private action for injured business people, see, eg., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 11 (Michie/Law.
Co-op Supp. 1984).
320. See, eg., United Van Lines, Inc. v. American Holiday Van Lines, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 235
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would have to demonstrate one of the following: (1) the plaintiff's language is so
closely identified with his product that the defendant's use of the language tends
to create confusion about the source of the defendant's product, or (2) the de-
fendant is reaping unfairly the benefits of the plaintiff's development and mar-
keting.321 The use of any of these theories, of course, may be preempted under
section 301 of the Copyright Act.
3 22
(E.D. Tenn. 1979) (Tennessee common law of unfair competition); Harrington Mfg. Co. v. Powell
Mfg. Co., 38 N.C. App. 393, 248 S.E.2d 739 (1978), cerL denied, 296 N.C. 411, 251 S.E.2d 469
(1979).
In 1918 the Supreme Court recognized a cause of action for misappropriation under federal
common law. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). The Court held
that even though plaintiff news agency could not copyright the facts in its news releases, defendant
could not review the early editions of plaintiff's newspapers and pirate the news to use as its own.
Id. at 226. The Court reasoned that one who had worked to obtain a product should be able to
benefit from it, rejecting defendant's argument that published news articles belonged to the public,
and considering instead the plaintiff's and defendant's relative rights as competitors.
International News Ser. expanded unfair competition to include the act of misappropriation
and eliminated the element of ultimate confusion of consumers. With the decline of federal common
law after Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), some federal courts have held that Interna-
tional News Ser. is no longer an independent source of a claim of unfair competition. See Roy
Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 672 F.2d 1095, 1105 (2d Cir. 1982); Schuchart & Assocs.
v. Solo Serve Corp., 540 F. Supp. 928, 942 n.9 (W.D. Tex. 1982). Yet the Supreme Court has never
overruled International News Serv., and several federal courts have cited it in allowing a common-
law unfair competition claim based on a misappropriation theory. See, eg., Miller v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1370 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing International News Ser. for misappropria-
tion theory); A & M Records, Inc. v. M.V.C. Dist. Corp., 574 F. 2d 312, 314 (6th Cir. 1978) (holding
plaintiff could obtain common-law relief); Servo Corp. of America v. General Electric Co., 337 F.2d
716, 725 (4th Cir. 1964) (plaintiff entitled to recover under common law). Some states have rejected
the International News Serv. theory and limit unfair competition to misrepresentation; eg., Lady
Esther, Ltd. v. Lady Esther Corset Shoppe, Inc., 317 Ill. App. 451, 46 N.E.2d 165 (1943) (stating
that the test is whether consumer will be deceived); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. New England
Newspaper Publishing Co., 46 F. Supp. 198, 203 (D. Mass. 1942) (holding that Massachusetts courts
would not follow International News Ser.); and others have cited International News Service in
finding misappropriation. E-g., Liberty/UA, Inc. v. Eastern Tape Corp., 11 N.C. App. 20,22 (1971)
(finding International News Serv. applicable).
321. A full discussion of these theories and their elements is beyond the scope of this Article.
322. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
Section 301 of the Copyright Act preempts state statutory and common-law protection when:
(i) the nature of the work at issue is within the subject matter of copyright as defined
in §§ 102 and 103 of the Copyright Act; and
(ii) the rights granted under state law are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright as specified by § 106 of the Copyright Act.
Accordingly, an unfair competition claim under state common or statutory law must concern either
intellectual property not protected by copyright or be based on state rights qualitatively different
from the rights protected by the Copyright Act. Compare Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet Mgt. Sys.,
591 F. Supp. 726, 739 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (mileage figures on highway maps entitled to copyright pro-
tection as compilations; process of compilation may be entitled to state-law misappropriation protec-
tion) and Bromhall v. Rorvik, 478 F. Supp. 361, 367 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (ideas protected by state
misappropriation law precisely because they are not protected by copyright) and Leonard Storch
Enters. Inc. v. Mergenthaler Linotype Co., 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 623 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (printing fonts
denied copyright protection but granted alternate state protection) with Durham Indus. Inc. v. Tomy
Corp., 630 F.2d. 905, 918-19 (2d Cir. 1980) (unfair competition claim preempted) and Synercom
Tech., Inc. v. University Computing Co., 474 F. Supp. 37, 42-43 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (state misappro-
priation doctrine preempted). In Durham Indus. a manufacturer of Wait Disney character figurines
sued for copyright infringement and unfair competition. The court, after rejecting the manufac-
turer's copyright claims because of lack of originality, also dismissed the unfair competition claim.
Citing § 301 of the Copyright Act, the court stated that a plaintiff cannot achieve with an unfair
competition claim what he has failed to achieve with a copyright claim, and held that the unfair
competition claim was preempted because it was based on a right equivalent to exclusive rights
within the scope of copyright. Durham Indus, 630 F.2d at 918-19. In Synercom the court had
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Although it is unlikely that user-level languages will receive copyright pro-
tection, evidence of a defendant's appropriation of a language still may be rele-
vant in a copyright infringement case. The difference between a literary work
and a computer program dictates a parallel difference in the focus of an infringe-
ment case-rather than comparing page by page the competing works, the de-
fendant's conduct must be analyzed. If this premise is accepted, the defendant's
appropriation of the plaintiff's user language may be significant. Consider an
admitted copyist who relies on the compatibility defense. The court must deter-
mine whether copying to achieve compatibility is more like computer industry
practices that should be tolerated, if not encouraged, so as to promote competi-
tion, or more like traditional literary plagiarism.3 2 3 That the defendant has ap-
propriated the plaintiff's language, a product of substantial creative effort, may
have some practical impact on the court's determination. Similarly, if the de-
fendant claims that any code-level similarities were incidental to his independent
creation and the case turns on the relative credibility of the parties, evidence of
the defendant's appropriation of a user language may be significant.3 2 4 Thus,
although defendant may not be independently liable for appropriating a user
language, such appropriation nevertheless may be relevant in evaluating other
acts of alleged infringement.
IV. SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY REVISITED: A Focus ON CONDUCT
This Article suggests in several contexts that the defendant's conduct
should be the critical inquiry in software copyright litigation. Liability should
not depend on substantial similarity between the copyrighted work and a partic-
ular version of the allegedly infringing work; rather, it should depend on
whether the defendant has engaged in conduct that infringes any of the plain-
tiff's exclusive statutory rights. This view draws support from four important
sources.
First, applying the substantial similarity test to a pair of computer pro-
grams may be a meaningless exercise for a trier of fact not well versed in com-
puter programming. Trivial distinctions may disguise, to the lay viewer, earlier
line-by-line copying. Second, subsequent alterations may be much more signifi-
cant in a computer case than a literary case. Since a plagiarist sometimes can
make alterations sufficient to "disguise the piracy" 325 on a computer with little
creative effort, and since such alterations may not substantially divest him of the
advantage he has gained from initially copying the plaintiff's program, there are
compelling reasons for not limiting the inquiry to the appearance of the work
granted copyright relief in an earlier decision, and it held that granting further relief under unfair
competition for the same conduct would create an unacceptable conflict between state and federal
law. Synercom, 474 F. Supp. at 43. See generally Denicola, supra note 298, at 517 n.7 (review of
copyright preemption doctrine and its effect on state-law theories); Shipley & Hay, supra note 298, at
152-58 (same).
323. See supra notes 212-21 and accompanying text.
324. Cf. Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 830 (11th Cir.
1982) (court comments on defendant's "insatiable interest" in plaintiff's copyrighted dolls).
325. Tennessee Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 279, 284 (5th Cir.), cert denied,
398 U.S. 928 (1970).
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that the defendant ultimately plans to distribute. 326
Third, several cases suggest indirectly that the appropriate focus in a copy-
right case is the defendant's conduct. In Hartfield v. Peterson,3 27 for example,
defendant denied copying, even though many of his words and phrases were
identical to those appearing in plaintiff's book. The court rejected defendant's
denial, considering among other things, that defendant had purchased a copy of
plaintiff's work well in advance of compiling his own. 328 Similarly, in Original
Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc.,329 the original Cabbage Patch doll
case, defendant denied that he had copied the dolls produced by the now famous
Xavier Roberts. As part of its inquiry the court examined defendant's conduct,
emphasizing defendant's "insatiable interest in the production techniques of
[plaintiff's] dolls," and finding that this "provided ample grounds for the trial
court's skeptical treatment" of defendant's claims of originality. 330 Further-
more, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Third and Ninth Circuits
have applied a two-part inquiry in infringement cases: they assess whether de-
fendant has copied and then evaluate the significance of any copying that has
been detected. 331 Although these circuits and other courts ultimately have used
the degree of similarity as the dispositive criterion, this two-step analysis never-
theless is consistent with the statutory focus on copying.
Last, courts should concentrate on the defendant's conduct because of the
language of the 1976 Act. Under the 1909 Act the exclusive rights of the au-
thors of literary works included the rights to print, reprint, publish, copy, vend,
translate, or dramatize the copyrighted work. 332 Section 106 of the 1976 Act
includes among the exclusive rights of the copyright holder the right "to prepare
derivative works based upon the copyrighted work."'333 Section 101 defines a
derivative work as "a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization . . .or any
other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted."
334
The language of section 106 suggests that preparing a derivative work in-
cludes more than just copying. If this language is taken literally, the defendant
need not copy verbatim or even paraphrase the copyrighted work, as long as he
uses it and his resulting work can be seen as "based upon" the copyrighted
work. The legislative history, although not extensive, is consistent with this in-
terpretation. The House Report notes that the exclusive right to prepare deriva-
tive works "overlaps the exclusive right of reproduction to some extent. It is
broader than that right, however, in the sense that reproduction requires fixation
in copies or phonorecords, whereas the preparation of a derivative work .. .
326. See supra notes 266-74 and accompanying text.
327. 91 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1937).
328. Id. at 999.
329. 684 F.2d 821 (11th Cir. 1982).
330. Id. at 830.
331. See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
332. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075; see supra note 256.
333. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1982).
334. Id. § 101.
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may be an infringement even though nothing is ever fixed in tangible form."' 335
The report also notes that, notwithstanding the breadth of the offense, "the in-
fringing work must incorporate a portion of the copyrighted work in some
form."
3 3 6
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit squarely contra-
dicted this interpretation of section 106 in the recent motion picture case of
Litchfield v. Spielberg.337 The court Tejected the proposition that a plaintiff
"does not have to show substantial similarity to show that [the accused work] is
a derivative work." 338 This holding, however, should not be considered control-
ling or even persuasive in computer software cases for two reasons. First, it is
easier to disguise original similarity between computer programs than between
movies. 339 Second, the Litchfield holding is premised on the court of appeals'
view that substantial similarity is an element of the offense and not merely a
form of circumstantial evidence of copying. 34° Other courts do not follow this
view and thus should find limited precedential value in Litchfield's interpreta-
tion of section 106.34
1
The literal scope of the copyright holder's exclusive right to prepare deriva-
tive works must be limited, so that every borrower of an idea is not threatened
335. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. News 5659, 5675.
336. Id.
337. 736 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1984).
338. Id. at 1357. Plaintiff alleged that defendant's movie, E T.-The Extraterrestrial, infringed
the copyright in a 1978 play plaintiff had written. The court rejected a traditional copyright claim
because of the absence of substantial similarity, id. at 1356-57, and dismissed as "frivolous" plain-
tiff's argument that an unlawful derivative work need not be substantially similar to the protected
work. Id. at 1357. The court criticized the plaintiff for "cit[ing] no authority to support this novel
proposition." Id. The principal authority, however, that the court cited to support its own position,
Harry Fox Agency, Inc. v. Mills Music, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 844, 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd on other
grounds, 720 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1983), cert granted, 104 S. Ct. 1676 (1984), appears not to be on
point. In Harry Fox, the court determined the respective rights of a composer and a music publisher
under a previously terminated license and copyright assignment. The page that the Spielberg court
cited from the Harry Fox district court opinion states that "[a] work is a 'derivative work' if it is
substantially derived from an underlying work." Harry Fox, 543 F. Supp. at 849. It does not state
or "suggest," however, as the court of appeals contends, that "a work is not derivative unless it has
been substantially copied from the prior work." Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1357 (emphasis added). The
other case that the court cites, Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir.),
cerL denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976), did use the "substantially copied" language, which it borrowed
from NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT. See M. NIMMER, supra note 59, § 3.01. Reyher was decided under
the 1909 Copyright Act. Moreover, the issue discussed in Reyher on the page that the Spielberg
court cited was whether a book written by the plaintiff was sufficiently distinct from a story in the
public domain to be a derivative work subject to copyright protection. Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1357
(citing Reyher, 533 F.2d at 90). Reyher did not address the offensive use of the right to produce
derivative works proposed by plaintiff in Litchfield.
339. See supra notes 266-71 and accompanying text.
340. See Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1355 ("To prove copyright infringement, the plaintiff must show
(1) ownership of the copyright, (2) access . . . and (3) substantial similarity .... "); id. at 1356
("To prove infringement, a plaintiff must show that the works are substantially similar in both ideas
and expression.") (both citing Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562
F.2d 1157, 1162-64 (9th Cir. 1977)). The Ninth Circuit's view of the significance of substantial
similarity is discussed supra note 149.
341. See supra notes 142-52 and accompanying text. Litchfield's use of precedent is also sus-
pect. See supra note 338.
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by the holder's "offensive" use of the right.342 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit adopted a practical approach in Midway Manufac-
turing Co. v. Artic International, Inc. 34 3 Plaintiff was the licensor of the Pac-
Man and Galaxian videogames. Defendant sold a printed circuit board that
would speed up play when inserted into one of the plaintiff's Galaxian game
machines. 344 After first discussing the validity of plaintiff's copyrights in the
games as audio-visual works,3 45 the court found that the entity the consumer
created by using both plaintiff's and defendant's products-a speeded-up Galax-
ian game-constituted a derivative work as defined in section 101.346 Defendant
analogized the effect of its product to speeding up a phonograph record-a triv-
ial activity that clearly would not yield an infringing derivative work.347 The
court rejected the analogy and, significantly, distinguished the speeded-up game
from a speeded-up record on economic grounds:
[T]he additional value to the copyright owner of having the right to
market separately the speeded-up version of the recorded performance
is too trivial to warrant legal protection for that right. A speeded-up
videogame is a substantially different product from the original game.
As noted, it is more exciting to play and it requires some creative effort
to produce. For that reason, the owner of the copyright on the game
should be entitled to monopolize it on the same theory that he is enti-
tled to monopolize the derivative works specifically listed in Section
101.348
The court determined that because the speeded-up game was a derivative work,
the consumer "who lacks the plaintiff's authorization to create a derivative work
is a direct infringer [under section 106(2)] and the defendant is a contributory
infringer through its sale of the speeded-up circuit board."
' 349
Thus, the court treated sections 101 and 106(2) as meaning what they say:
one who creates an unauthorized derivative work infringes, and derivative works
are not only the enumerated examples-such as translations, dramatizations,
and motion picture versions-but other works not named in the statute that are
similarly "based upon" the original. 350 Most significantly, the court defined the
category of derivative works using economic considerations. The court held that
if, because the defendant has based his work on the plaintiff's work, the limited
monopoly that the Copyright Act confers on the plaintiff is frustrated substan-
342. The phrase "offensive derivative work theory" refers to the use of § 106(2) to impose liabil-
ity independent of the substantial similarity test. This use contrasts with the older and more com-
mon "defensive" use of § 106(2) to determine the extent of copyright protection for a second work
that draws on a preexisting work. See supra note 260.
343. 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983).
344. Id. at 1010-11.
345. The court found that the games were subject to protection, notwithstanding that the user
contributed to the final pattern of images. Id. at 1011-12; see 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a)(6) (1982)
(defining "motion pictures and other audiovisual works" and including them in coverage of Copy-
right Act).
346. Midway, 704 F.2d at 1013-14.
347. Id. at 1013.
348. Id. at 1014.
349. Id. at 1013.
350. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1982).
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tially, the defendant has violated section 106; if the interference with the plain-
tiff's monopoly is economically trivial, the defendant has not violated the
plaintiff's exclusive rights, even though the allegedly infringing work in some
sense is "based upon" the original.
351
V. CONCLUSION: A UNIFYING THEORY FOR SOFrwARE COPYRIGHT
LITIGATION
It often will be inappropriate in software cases simply to compare the com-
peting works to determine whether they are substantially similar. Rather, the
technology dictates a focus on the defendant's conduct and any advantage he
has gained from it. This approach is implicit in many cases, and more impor-
tantly, is consistent with the statutory language and the limited case authority
construing it.
Based on these practical and legal considerations, the following is proposed
as a unifying theory for software copyright litigation:
(1) The court should read the Copyright Act literally to prohibit
conduct inconsistent with the copyright holder's exclusive rights. The
court should not follow literary cases by concluding immediately that
no direct evidence will be available and that substantial similarity must
be the dispositive criterion. In a computer case, direct evidence not
only may exist, but it may be more useful than inferences drawn from
comparing the works.
(2) The court should look beyond the final version of the defend-
ant's work to determine whether he engaged in unauthorized copying.
The court first should determine whether the defendant engaged in un-
authorized copying while developing his work. Following indirectly
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Midway
Manufacturing Co. v. Artic International, Inc.,352 the court next should
evaluate the economic significance of any copying: if the defendant
copied while developing his work, received a substantial economic ben-
efit from doing so, and that economic benefit persists in the final prod-
uct, he should be held to have violated the plaintiff's copyright,
regardless of whether the defendant's final product appears to be a
copy of the original. Thus, if the defendant copied while developing
his work, his subsequent alterations should exonerate him only if they
eliminate the economic advantage he gained by copying. This ap-
proach will minimize the inequity of the subsequent alteration defense,
yet prevent a copyright holder from inhibiting competition because of
a literal but trival copyright violation.
(3) Absent evidence of copying, the court should examine whether
351. Midway used a similar argument in a suit against the producer of a Pac-Man modification
kit. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983). In this case, however, the court
did not consider § 106(2) as an independent source of liability. It found that defendant's product did
not infringe Midway's audio-visual work copyright because the kit produced an audio-visual work
not substantially similar to Pac-Man. Id. at 747-78. The court enjoined Strohon's kit nonetheless,
partly on trademark grounds and partly because it contained ROMs that infringed Midway's copy-
right in the Pac-Man object code. Id. at 749-54.
352. 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983).
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the defendant's work constitutes a derivative work, again focusing on
the defendant's conduct. The court should determine whether the de-
fendant developed his program by basing it on or deriving it from the
plaintiff's program. There are three pertinent questions: First, did the
defendant make substantial physical use of the plaintiff's work by, for
example, dissecting a copy of the plaintiff's source code that the de-
fendant had received under a license agreement or decompiling an
ROM he had purchased? Second, did the defendant borrow from the
plaintiff's program material detailed enough that it could be character-
ized as expression? The Copyright Act will apply only if the material
appropriated was a detailed outline of the program, if not code itself,
and not merely general programming ideas. For reasons discussed in
the preceding recommendation, the plaintiff need only show that the
defendant appropriated such material at some point in the develop-
ment process, regardless of the ultimate similarity of the two works.
Third, did the defendant derive a substantial economic advantage from
using the plaintiff's work? This inquiry is designed to prevent copy-
right holders from inhibiting competition unreasonably. Again, the
subsequent alteration defense should apply only if the alterations elimi-
nated the advantage the defendant gained from his otherwise unlawful
use of the plaintiff's program.
(4) Focusing on the defendant's conduct and any advantage he
derived from it, the court should consider all relevant circumstantial
evidence. The defendant's subsequent alterations may be evidence that
he earlier engaged in significant copying or derivation. Similarly, the
defendant's appropriation of a user-level language may be relevant to
his credibility in determining whether similarities between his and the
plaintiff's programs resulted from derivation or were incidental to the
program's functional equivalency. Substantial similarity of the com-
peting works is also circumstantial evidence. Although in many cases
it will remain the most important circumstantial evidence, it should
not be considered the sole relevant circumstantial evidence, nor should
its preeminence be presumed conclusively.
Although this model requires the court to make many subjective judg-
ments, so does the prevailing interpretation of the Copyright Act. In software
litigation, however, traditional copyright doctrine requires judgments that are
likely to be uninformed and thus conjectural. For example, how can a district
court decide whether the facial similarity of two source codes is substantial?
353
The proposed model instead requires judgments of human conduct and eco-
nomic significance-matters with which courts and jurors deal daily. The pro-
posed model, although imperfect, will balance more equitably the competing
interests of free competition and reasonable proprietary expectations, and will
do so in a manner consistent with the letter and spirit of the Copyright Act.
353. It recently has been suggested that the manner in which an allegedly infringing program
organizes and processes data will provide important clues in determining whether another program
was used in its creation. See McClure & Sher, Evaluating Claims of Software Copying Through Data
Analysis (Part M1), 3 SoFrwARE PROTECTION 6 (Aug. 1984).
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ADDENDUM: NOTE ON RECENTLY DECIDED CASES
Since this Article went to press, two United States District Courts have
issued opinions dealing with infringement of a copyright in computer software.
The reasoning in both cases is consistent with some of the views expressed in this
Article.
In the first case, Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory,
Inc.,354 plaintiff Whelan was the assignee of the copyright in a program written
in a language called EDL and intended for use on IBM minicomputers. 355 The
program originally had been developed for defendant Jaslow, which therefore
had access to the source code for the EDL version. 356 Without authorization
from Whelan, a programmer working under Jaslow's direction prepared a BA-
SIC language version of the program that would run on IBM Personal Com-
puters (PCs). 357 The second version was virtually identical to the original in
mode of operation and functions performed.
358
After disposing of several preliminary issues, the court turned to the "more
difficult factual determination .. .as to whether the IBM-PC program...
constitutes copyright infringement. '359 The court stated that although the idea
of a program for performing a particular function is not protected, "[tihe expres-
sion of the idea embodied in a computer program is protected by the copyright
laws even though it must be altered and refined to be made adaptable to different
types of computers that have different methods of responding to command con-
trols and therefore require different source codes.''36° The court reasoned from
this legal premise in finding that the PC version of the program infringed even
though it was not a literal copy or translation of the original.361 Relying on the
testimony of plaintiff's expert, the court emphasized that defendant's program-
mer had acquired thorough knowledge from his access to the original pro-
gram, 362 and that "prospective users and customers. . . found no substantial
difference between the [two programs], and considered them to be the same."
'363
The procedural history of the second case, SAS Institute, Inc. v. S&H Com-
puter Systems, Inc.,3 64 is outlined above.3 65 The court found the facts to be
substantially as alleged by SAS Institute.366 Programmers affiliated with S&H
set out to create a version of the Institute's SAS program for computers other
than the large IBM computers for which it originally had been written. 367 The
354. No. 83-4583 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 1985).
355. Slip op. at 3-5, 7-8.
356. Id. at 15.
357. Id. at 15-16.
358. Id at 33-35.
359. Id at 29.
360. Id. at 30.
361. Id. at 31-35.
362. Id at 18-19, 34-35.
363. Id. at 34.
364. Nos. 82-3669, 82-3670 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 6, 1985).
365. See supra note 158.
366. Slip op. at 1-19.
367. Id at 4-5.
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new product was to be fully compatible with SAS,3 68 so that SAS users would
notice no functional differences between the two programs. In writing the new
program, which was in a different computer language than SAS, the S&H pro-
grammers studied SAS source code, copied the SAS code literally in a number of
instances, and appropriated extensively the structure and organizational details
of SAS. 369 After the dispute began, S&H made a concerted effort to edit the
new program to minimize its similarity to SAS. The court characterized this an
"an effort to mask and disguise evidence of copying."'370
In finding infringement, the court dealt directly with a number of the issues
raised in this Article. First, the court eschewed the "ordinary lay observer"
approach to substantial similarity, instead accepting the testimony of an expert
witness on this point. 371 Second, the court found that both literal copying of
source code and appropriation of organizational details constituted borrowing of
expression. 372 In reaching this conclusion, the court observed that a computer
program's function does not dictate its form to the extent suggested by S&H:
"Even in the case of simple statistical calculations, there is room for variation
S.. .,373 Third, the court recognized that the quality, as well as quantity, of
observed similarities may be relevant to their substantiality: "[T]he piracy of
even a quantitatively small fragment ('a rose by any other name would smell as
sweet') may be qualitatively substantial.
'374
Fourth, the court found that besides being an infringing copy in the sense of
being substantially similar to SAS, the S&H product was an infringing derivative
work. 375 The court based its analysis on the premise that "The [copyright] stat-
ute deals with human conduct, the nature of the activity which resulted in the
defendant's product. ' 376 The court evaluated S&H's conduct in light of the
statutory definition of derivative work and found that "the product was substan-
tially and pervasively 'based upon' SAS."
' 377
Last, the court rejected a subsequent alteration defense. The court dis-
missed out of hand S&H's contention that it had not violated copyright law
because the version of its product distributed had been edited to the point that it
was no longer substantially similar to SAS. As the court put it, "S&H's argu-
ment that it can cure its infringement by simple excision is flatly inconsistent
with the statute. '373 The court analogized the argument to the contention that
a plagiarist "can misappropriate every internal and external feature of a build-
ing, [and] can then cure any impropriety by changing the tint of the windows
368. Id. at 6.
369. Id. at 9-18.
370. Id. at 13.
371. Id. at 10.
372. Id. at 16-17, 25-26.
373. Id. at 17.
374. Id. at 25.
375. Id. at 26-27.
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and the color of the siding."
379
379. Id
